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Notes
Administrative Law-FPC v. Texaco: Congress, not the Court,
Should Deregulate Natural Gas Producers
The Federal Power Commission is authorized by the Natural Gas
Act' to insure that rates charged for natural gas sold or transported in
interstate commerce are "just and reasonable."2 In reviewing FPC
rate regulations to determine if the test of "just and reasonable" has
been met,3 courts have pursued a policy of flexibility based upon the
assumption that a Commission order is a "product of expert judgment
which carries a presumption of validity."'4 Pursuant to this policy, the
courts have sustained Commission ordered rates based upon a variety
of formulas. 5 When the Commission, however, prices gas on the basis
of contract prices or upon the unregulated intrastate market price,' conflicting judicial attitudes have emerged. 7 The Court in FPC v. Texaco, Inc.8 finally defined the role that market price could play in rate
determinations for producers. The Court rejected the standard of
market price as the sole determinant of "just and reasonable" but stated
that it could be a relevant factor in future rate considerations. Although the Court restricted the Commission's use of market price, it
did further the earlier policy of flexibility by approving for -the first time
a different method of rate regulation for small producersY
1. Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1970).
2. Id. § 717c.
3. Commission orders are subject to initial review by a court of appeals of the
United States, subject to final review by the Supreme Court. Id. § 717r(b).
4. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944).
5. See, e.g., id. (individual company cost-of-service method of regulation);
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968) (area price approach).
6. It is estimated that there are some 30,000 domestic oil and gas producers.
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, NATURAL GAS DEREG-

ULATION LEGISLATION 15 (1973).

The FPC has jurisdiction over producers involved in
the sale or transportation of gas interstate. There are approximately 4,000 interstate
producers. See note 17 infra. The sizeable intrastate market, consisting of the remainder of producers, is not regulated by the FPC. These intrastate producers currently
account for almost 40% of the volume of gas produced. C. Hawkins, Structure of the
Natural Gas Producing Industry, in REGULA7ION OF THE NATURAL GAS PRODUCING INDusRY 137, 156 (1972).
7. The Court in Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968), concluded
that the Commission could find in the future that market price would protect consumer
interests; whereas the Court in FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391 U.S. 9, 25-26 (1968),
stated that the Commission's use of market prices as the final measure of reasonableness would contradict the assumption of Congress that the market for natural gas is uncompetitive and requires regulation.
8. 417 U.S. 380 (1974).
9. "A 'small produce? was defined as an independent producer, not affiliated with
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AND THE COURT'S DECISION

FPC v. Texaco resulted from FPC Order No. 42810 that exempted
small producers of gas from direct rate regulation and allowed them
to sell their gas at any price obtainable on the open market. Since
large producer and pipeline companies purchase most of the gas produced by small producers, the Commission decided to review small
producer prices for gas only at the large producer and pipeline level.
Thus, small producer prices would be regulated, but only indirectly.

Large producers and pipelines would have to justify the prices paid to
small producers before these costs could be passed along to the consumer. If the prices paid by these companies to small producers were
deemed excessive by the Commission, then large producer and pipeline companies would alone be responsible for absorbing the excesses.

Small producer charges would never be subject to refunds to large producer or pipeline companies under the order. The Commission
hoped that freeing small producers from direct rate regulation would
result in greater exploration and increased supplies of natural gas. 1
Large producer and pipeline companies objected to Order 428
arguing that allowing small producers to charge market prices, in effect
deregulated the small producers in contravention of the Natural Gas
Act.' 2 Large producer and pipeline companies sought judicial review
of Order 428 in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. That
court, agreeing with the large producers, set aside the FPC order'8 and
the Commission appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals decision and

upheld the method of indirect regulation provided in the order by stating that the Natural Gas Act calls for no specific method of regulaa natural gas pipeline company whose total jurisdictional sales on a nationwide basis,
together with sales of affiliated producers, did not exceed 10,000,000 Mcf at 14.65 psia
during any calendar year. New small producer sales included any sale made pursuant
to a contract dated after March 18, 1971." Id. at 383 n.1.
10. 18 C.F.R. § 157.40 (1973).
11. Small producers were singled out for speciaF treatment since they traditionally
account for over 80% of all new exploration for gas. Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 474 F.2d
416, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd, 417 U.S. 380 (1974). The major goal of Order 428
was to increase gas supplies. Thd natural gas shortage has been judicially recognized.
See Louisiana Power & Light Co.,. 406 U.S. 621 (1972); Placid Oil Co. v. FPC, 483
F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U.S. 283 (1974);
Southern La. Area Rate Cases v. FPC, 428 F.2d 407 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
950 (1970).
12. See Brief for Respondent Phillips Petroleum Co. at 32-39, Brief for Respondent
Texaco, Inc. at 9-12, FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380 (1974).
13. Texaco, Inc. v. FPC,474 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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tion. 14 It remanded Order 428 to the Commission, however, with the
instructions that, although market prices could be considered, they
could not be the sole factor in determining whether the prices charged
by small producers were "just and reasonable."

The Court reasoned

that allowing the Commission to rely solely on market prices would be
tantamount to deregulation of small producers in contravention of Con-

gress's mandate in the Natural Gas Act that gas prices be regulated.1 5
The Court felt bound by the congressional finding that the natural gas
industry is not competitive and that prices charged by gas producers
must be justified on a basis other than the unregulated market standard.
COURT'S POLICY OF FLEXIBILITY

The Commission and the courts have struggled with the regulation
of interstate natural gas producers since the Supreme Court decided
in Phillips v. Wisconsin"6 that the FPC had jurisdiction over producers.
Phillips added over 4000 producers to the regulatory burdens of the
Commission.1 7 Since this decision, the Court has followed a policy of
14. FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380 (1974). Before the Supreme Court, the
FPC joined by small producers argued that Order 428 was simply a new technique of
regulating a segment of the industry and that the Natural Gas Act does not specify any
method of regulation. They maintained that indirect regulation of small producers
would spur exploration by these companies by eliminating cumbersome administrative
filing requirements and direct review. Regarding the court of appeals decision that a
market price standard for reviewing small producer rates resulted in deregulation in violation of the Natural Gas Act, the Commission and small producers advanced different
arguments justifying the standard as expressed in Order 428. In its brief, the Commission maintained that the court of appeals misread Order 428. The Commission contended that the standard for review of small-producer charges in the order did not rest
exclusively on market price. It argued that the order called for the consideration of
"other relevant factors" in addition to market price. Small producers directly confronted
the issue of a market price standard by stating that nothing in the Natural Gas Act requires regulation of all producer prices. They argued that, upon a determination by the
Commission that market prices could effectively protect consumer interests (insure "just
and reasonable" rates), such a standard is permissible under the Act. See Brief for Petitioner at 18, Brief for the Small Producer Group as Amicus Curiae at 7 n.3, FPC v.
Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380 (1974).
15. The Court found that the standard upon which small producer charges would
be reviewed was the market standard despite Commission attempts to explain that it
would consider other relevant factors upon review. The Court stated that "we cannot
'accept appellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency action'. . . ." 417 U.S.
at 397, quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962).
16. 347 U.S. 672 (1954). This decision was based on language in the Natural Gas
Act that the Court determined required submission of natural gas producers to regulation
under the Act. The decision was not based on any congressional findings regarding the
existence of a monopoly in the gas producing industry as there was in the 1930's when
gas pipeline companies were initially subjected to FPC regulation under the Act. See
Note, Legislative History of the Natural Gas Act, 44 GEo. L.J. 695, 721-23 (1956).
17. There are several different figures reported for the number of producers subject
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flexibility towards Commission attempts to find a workable method of
regulation.' 8 The Commission's first efforts to assure "just and reasonable" prices to consumers were based on an individual company, costof-service analysis.' 9 This method required Commission review of
each individual gas producer for a determination of the proper rates
it could charge based on its costs of operation. The Court in FPC v.
Hope Natural Gas Co.2" had earlier sustained this method of regulation

for pibelines by stating very simply that, so long as the result of the
Commission's regulation is protection of consumer and investor interests,
the program would be sustained.2 '
The cost-of-service analysis proved to be very time consuming, however, and the Commission soon formulated a new method of regula-

tion.22 It divided the country into five geographic regions and allowed
producers within each region to charge prices that were based on the
average costs of production within their particular area.23 This scheme
greatly reduced the administrative burdens of the Commission although
it did not effectively deal with small producers. The Court in Permian
Basin Area Rate Cases24 sustained this new method of regulation contuining its earlier announced policy of flexibility in dealing with FPC
regulation of producers. Nonetheless, it admonished the Commission
to the Federal Power Commission's jurisdiction in 1954 when Phillips was decided. In
1955, Dr. John W. Boatwright, economist for Standard Oil Company of Indiana, testified
that there were some 8,100 producers of natural gas in the United States. Hearings on
S. 712, S. 1248, S. 1853, S. 1880, S. 1926, & S. 2001 Before the Senate Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 143-44 (1955). The figure of
"over 4,000 producers" is reported in AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INsTrrUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, supra note 6, at 11.
18. E.g., cases cited note 5 supra.
19. The cost-of-service regulatory approach is traditionally used in the regulation
of utilities. For a discussion of why this approach is not suitable to the gas producing
industry see Breyer & MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation of Natural Gas Producers,86 HRv. L. REv. 941, 952-58 (1973); Connole, General Considerations: a Nation's Natural-Gas Pains,44 GEo. L.J. 555, 563-65 (1956). See Swift, Federal Power Commission Regulation of Interstate Sales by Independent Natural Gas
Producers, 10 S. TEx. L.J. 183 (1968) (discussion of the Phillips case and initial FPC
attempts at regulation based on the individual company cost-of-service method).
20. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
21. "Under the statutory formula of 'just and reasonable' it is the result reached
not the method employed which is controlling." Id. at 602.
22. By 1960 only ten cases of 2900 had been decided by the Commission. The
Phillips case alone, for example, required eighty-two days of hearings. See Breyer &
MacAvoy, supra note 19, at 952-54.
23. The five areas were: (1) The Permian Basin (Texas and part of New Mexico); (2) Southern Louisiana (including the offshore area in the Gulf of Mexico); (3)
Hugoton-Anadarko (part of Oklahoma and Kansas); (4) Texas Gulf Coast; and (5)
Other Southwest (Mississippi, Arkansas, and part of Alabama, Texas and Oklahoma).
Id. at 958 n.65.
24. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
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to deal with the problems of small producers in future rate proceedings.
The judicial policy of flexibility regarding Commission experiments in regulation has, however, not been consistently applied when
the Commission has attempted to allow market price to determine "just
and reasonable" rates. Several lower courts rejected market price in
initial pricing proceedings under section 7 of the Act because there was
no evidence introduced to support a finding that the unregulated price
in the field, if adopted ,bya producer, would meet the test of "just and
reasonable."2 5 There was, however, no holding in these cases that, if
proof could be offered that the unregulated price would protect consumer interests, market price would not be sustained. Permian intimated that market price could be the sole determinative standard for
area rates in the future so long as consumer and investor interests were
protected. 20 There is, however, one case, FPC v. Sunray DX Oil
Co., 27 that maintains in dicta that, even if evidence were introduced
to support a finding that market price could protect consumer and investor interests, the Commission and the court could not allow use of
such a scheme.28 The Court in Sunray stated that regulation based upon
unregulated market prices would conflict with the congressional assumption expressed in the Natural Gas Act that the industry requires
regulation because the market for natural gas is not competitive. According to the language in this case, the Commission could never justify
the unregulated market price as a "just and reasonable" price and still
comply with the Natural Gas Act.
FPC v. Texaco, Inc.29 followed the policy of flexibility expressed
in earlier court reactions to FPC experiments in regulating producers.
By sanctioning a scheme of indirect regulation, the Court indicated that
it would allow the Commission not only to treat small producers differently in an attempt to encourage more gas production in a time of
25. See, e.g., United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 290 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1961);
Forest Oil Corp. v. FPC, 263 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1959). The Natural Gas Act requires
that a company desiring to engage in the transportation or sale of natural gas, subject
to the Commission's jurisdiction, obtain from the Commission a certificate of public convenience and necessity. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1970). Since the Court's decision in Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959), initial rates must be determined to be in the public interest prior to proceedings under section four of the Act,
where the Commission finally sets the rate that meets the requirement of "just and reasonable." 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1970).
26. 390 U.S. at 795.
27. 391 U.S. 9 (1968).
28. Id. at 25.
29. 417 U.S. 380 (1974).
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shortage, but also to place upon large producers and pipelines the burden of justifying in later proceedings the costs of small producer
charges. The Court, relying on Hope, pointed out that the Natural Gas
Act does not require any particular method of regulation. 30 Indeed, the
Court's inquiry is not focused upon the method utilized but upon
whether that method ensures "just and reasonable" rates. The Court
also pursued a policy of flexibility regarding the application of market
price to the standard of "just and reasonable." It stated that market
price should and would be an appropriate consideration in determining the standard of "just and reasonable" prices.3 1 But the Court refused to let market price be the sole determinant of this standard. Instead, it held that, so long as Congress intends to regulate the interstate
natural gas industry, unregulated prices like those found in the intrastate market can never be the final measure of "just and reasonable"
rates. The Court emphasized that, if the market has become competitive (as recent economic studies suggest), it is the responsibility of
Congress to take steps towards deregulating the industry.12 Thus, the
Court in Texaco pursued the policy of flexibility towards Commission
regulatory experiments to the limits of congressional intent as
expressed in the Natural Gas Act. This decision properly places upon
Congress the obligation to respond to an alarming shortage of natural
gas. Congress should now seriously consider deregulating the natural
gas producing industry.
AN

ARGUMENT FOR CONGRESSIONAL

DEREGULATION

In determining whether deregulation is the appropriate response
by Congress to the shortage of natural gas, the results of regulation under the Act and the present market structure of the gas producing industry must be examined. Initially, Congress sought to regulate the
natural gas industry because it believed that major pipeline companies
had monopolized the market and were exploiting consumers by charging excessive prices. " The same rationale is applied to producers as
30. Id. at 391-92. See also Note, Public Utility Rate Regulation-Tine for Reevaluation, 51 N.C.L. REv. 1140 (1973).

31. Id. at 394-97. FPC v. Texaco has recently been cited for this holding in Moss
v. FPC, 502 F.2d 461, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
32. 417 U.S. at 400. The Court recognizes in a footnote that economists have
found that the natural gas market has become competitive and that further regulation
would prove counterproductive; however, the Court stipulates that it is bound by congressional intent. Id. at 400 n.9.
33. These congressional findings were based on a report by the FTC on the natural gas industry. F.T.C., FINAL REPORT, S. Doc. No. 92, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 84A (1936).
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a result of the Court's finding in Phillips that the Natural 'Gas Act includes the regulation of natural gas producers. 3 4 Regulation of the industry was expected to reduce prices paid by consumers by eliminating
windfall profits to producers. Congress's primary goal of lower consumer prices for natural gas has resulted from regulation. Yet, through
cost-benefit analysis, economists conclude that the long term effect of
regulation has not benefited the consumer because lower prices have
had a negative impact on the supply of gas.3 5
A study conducted by Professors Breyer and MacAvoy shows that
producer regulation saved consumers about $660 million annually assuming that every cent of price reduction at the wellhead was passed
through to the ultimate consumer.3 6 They maintain, however, that consumer losses far outweigh the benefits of lower prices. They contend,
as have other economists, that FPC price regulation has been the major
inhibitor of the supply of gas. Regulation has produced greater demand at lower prices, but lower prices have not produced the incentives
necessary for exploration and development of gas reserves that are now
more difficult and expensive to find. Breyer and MacAvoy conclude
that the present federal regulation of natural gas imposes high costs on
the interstate consumer by forcing him to purchase more expensive alternative fuels, reducing the dependability of his gas supply and subsi7
dizing the industrial user of natural gas in intrastate markets.
With this evidence that regulation has not benefited the consumer,
the more important question for Congress is whether increased supplies
34. See note 16 supra.
35. See, e.g., K. Brown, Introduction to REGULATION OF THE NATURAL GAS PRODUCING INDUSTRY 1 (1972); C. Hawkins, supra note 6, at 137; M. Russell, ProducerRegulation for the 1970s, in REGULATION OF THE NATURAL GAS PRODUCING INDUSTRY 219
(1972); Breyer & MacAvoy, supra note 19, at 976-79.
36. Breyer & MacAvoy, supra note 19, at 980.
37. Breyer and MacAvoy report that due to lower regulated prices, the supply of
natural gas was reduced. As a result of decreased supplies some consumers (usually
those consumers in new or growing population centers) had to do without gas and find

other more costly sources of energy, such as oil or electricity.

In addition, Breyer and

MacAvoy maintain that FPC ceiling prices resulted in the development of fewer gas re-

serves. This meant that consumers had to give up a substantial amount of their guarantee of future service. For example, gas reserves promise an availability of gas service
for the consumer who has invested in gas appliances. Breyer and MacAvoy present data
which estimates that at current ceiling prices additional gas reserves are being developed
at less than half of anticipated consumer needs. Furthermore, they explain that most
of the gas reserves now being discovered and developed are being sold in the intrastate
market at higher prices. The major purchasers and consumers of intrastate gas are in-

dustrial users rather than residential consumers.

Thus, the industrial user is more as-

sured of gas supplies at the expense of the residential consumer whose supply normally
comes through interstate sales. Id. at 977-84.

772

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

of gas would be forthcoming at acceptable prices absent regulation.
Several recent economic studies show the market for natural gas to be
at least workably competitive. 38 Two principal indicia are traditionally
used by economists to measure the degree of monopoly power (market
power) contained within a specific industry: the ratio of concentration
and barriers to entry of new gas producing groups. Breyer and MacAvoy report that FPC statistics show that in the early 1960's the largest
gas producer accounted for less than ten percent, and the fifteen largest
producers, for less than fifty percent of natural gas production.3 In
the separate area markets, statistics indicate that the degree of production concentration is "'lower than that in 75-85 percent of industries
in manufactured products.' "40
Another economist, Clark Hawkins, has reported similar findings.41 He found that the largest eight firms in the natural gas production industry account for 40% of all sales, while the rest of the market
is relatively unconcentrated. 42 He argues that the large unconcentrated
sector could be considered a competitive constraint on the behavior of
the largest eight firms. Regarding barriers to entry, the Hawkins study
concludes that they are substantially less than in most manufacturing
industries, except for possibly the risk factor. 43 In addition to these
studies by economists, at least one court 44 and the Commission 4 have
concluded independently that the market for natural gas now appears
to be competitive.
Since competitive forces should keep prices down while increasing
supplies of gas, deregulation of the natural gas industry now appears
to be the only realistic policy to elicit more supplies of gas. 40 During
the first year that Order 428 was in effect with small producer prices
38. See authorities cited note 35 supra.
39. Breyer & MacAvoy, supra note 19, at 946.
40. Id., quoting P. MACAVoY, THE CRISiS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 156
(1970).
41. C. Hawkins, supra note 6, at 141.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 138. Hawkins argues that the risk factor may not have a significant
effect since high-risk ventures produce high returns and some types of investors are
anxious to support gas producing ventures.
44. Southern La. Area Rate Cases v. FPC, 428 F.2d 407, 416 n.10 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970).
45. Belco Petroleum Corp., 49 F.P.C. 1154, 1164 (1973).
46. Recently President Ford advocated the deregulation of natural gas in a message
to Congress, 120 CoNG. REC. 10,120 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1974). Although higher prices
would result for consumers in a time of rampant inflation, more energy supplies are considered essential.
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tied to the higher market price, significant exploratory activity occurred.17 This evidence dispells arguments by some skeptics of deregulation that the supply of natural gas is not responsive to price and
that higher prices for gas would result in windfalls to producers.
Consumer prices under deregulation would necessarily rise to
elicit new supplies. Yet, if the findings by economists and the Commission are correct, these higher prices would not be the result of monopolistic forces but would represent the incentives necessary to increase exploration and development of gas reserves. The impact on
consumer prices for three different levels of -price increases has been
estimated by Foster Associates, an economic consulting group. 48 At
the middle level of sixty-five cents per mcf 49 (150% of the present
national ceiling rate) annual consumer expenditures for gas would rise
from approximately $155 in 197250 to $196 by 1980, 5' only a 3.4%
yearly increase.5 2 In comparison with annual consumer expenditures
for other goods, this hardly seems excessive. 53
Deregulation of the natural gas industry by Congress would also
seem preferable to further Commission efforts to increase supplies by
formulas based on cost-of-service, average geographical area costs or
any other calculations. The Commission has been unable -to arrive at
any satisfactory regulatory formula over the past twenty years. One
commentator maintains that further attempts would be equally unsatisfactory. He describes present Commission attempts to arrive at a regulated price as
pseudo-science to a degree it would be difficult to equal. At the
determination [of rate proceedings], the examiner's fumbling
among the numbers and making a cafeteria-style selection from
those presented, plus the commission adding a few delicate adjust54
ments of its own, make the whole thing nothing short of ludicrous.
47. 1 FPC, NATIONAL GAS SURVEY, cl. 9, at 52 (Preliminary Draft 1970).
48.

FOSTER ASSOCIATES,

INC., THE IMPACr OF DEREGULATION ON NATURAL GAS

PRiCEs (1973).

49. Mcf (thousand cubic feet) is the traditional volume measurement for natural
gas.
50. FosTER AssocuTEs, INC., supra note 48, at 15.
51. Id. at 22.
52. Id. at viii.
53. Foster reports that average annual consumer expenditures for toilet articles are
$117, for tobacco products $189. It is in relation to these expenditures that consumer
costs for natural gas are compared. Id. at 18.
54. C. Hawkins, supra note 6, at 165. See also SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATrVE
PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,

SEss., REPORT ON

THE REGULATORY

AGENCIES

86TH CONG.,

TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT

2D

.54 (Comm.

Print 1960),. where the Landis Commission concluded that "[tihe Federal Power Corn-
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An example of such fumbling is the FPC's recent response to the
Court's remand of FPC Order 428 in FPC v. Texaco. The Commission
in a proposed rule-making order seeks again indirectly to regulate small
producers similar to the terms of Order 428, but proposes to set the
standard for a "just and reasonable" price at 150% of what large producers may sell gas for at the applicable ceiling rate.Yr The Commission does not define how it arrived at the 150% figure; it simply states
that given small producer higher costs and their valuable contributions
to exploration activities such a higher rate would be justifiable. Of
course, as with other proposed orders, the Commission invites comments on the rate and submits that the figure they present is subject
to change before the final order, if evidence suggests that some other
percentage better meets the test of "just and reasonable." But nonetheless, -this latest proceeding raises the suspicion that present efforts
at regulating the natural gas industry are based more upon Commission
guess-work than expertise.
CONCLUSION

In sum, further Commission attempts to arrive at a magic formula

for regulating the interstate natural gas industry is a dubious exercise.
Given recent conclusions that the -market for natural gas is workably
competitive, further FPC regulation is unnecessary and counterproductive. The decision in FPC v. Texaco, Inc., given the current wording
of the Natural Gas Act, could not allow the Commission to experiment
with partial deregulation of the producer industry. What is needed is
congressional action. In the face of severe shortages of natural gas,
it is now imperative that Congress react to this decision, the latest economic findings and the advice of the President by deregulating the natural gas producing industry.
CHARLOTTE A. CUNNINGHAM
mission without question represents the outstanding example in the federal government
of the breakdown of the administrative process."
55. 39 Fed. Reg. 33241 (1974).

19751

DEALER-LOCATION CLAUSES

775

Antitrust Law-Enforcement of Dealer-Location Clauses
Declared Per Se Illegal
The 1967 decision of the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.' has had a dramatic impact on the business world's attempts to comply with federal antitrust guidelines. In
Schwinn the Court held that vertically imposed territorial and customer
restraints2 were to be examined under the rule of reason if the manufacturer retained "title, dominion, and risk" over his product, but were
per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Ac if similar restraints
were imposed by the manufacturer when the transaction constituted a
sale of the product. 5 The Ninth Circuit was recently faced with the
problem of defining the scope of Schwinn in GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc.,' a case involving neither territorial nor customer resale restrictions. The court, nevertheless, held that dealer-location restrictions 7 are per se unlawful under section 1 of the Sherman Act
when they are enforced by the manufacturer. 8
The dispute in Sylvania resulted from a new distribution scheme
initiated by the manufacturer, Sylvania, with which it attempted to limit
the number of franchises in a given area. The plan was devised to
reduce intrabrand competition among retailers with the ultimate goal
of fostering interbrand competition for Sylvania products. In the fall
of 1965, Continental, one of Sylvania's largest dealers, opened an unau1. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
2. A vertically imposed territorial restraint exists when a manufacturer transfers
his products to a distributor with the restriction that the distributor resell the products
only to retailers in a particular territory. The manufacturer could also deal directly with
the retailer and impose similar restraints. On the other hand, a customer resale restraint
prohibits the distributor or retailer from reselling to a particular class of customers.
See P. AEEDA, ANTrUsr ANALYSIS 530-31 (2d ed. 1974); Note, Restricted Channels
of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 HRv. L. REv. 795 (1962).
3. Mr. Chief Justice White launched the rule of reason in Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The test is designed to analyze the reason for the
restraint and its effect as a restraint on competition.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). Section 1 of the Sherman Act was passed in 1890 and
states: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce. . . is declared to be illegal."
5. 388 U.S. at 379-80. All of the following analysis in this note pertains equally
to a manufacturer dealing directly with a retailer as well as imposing similar restraints
regarding the retailer's dealing with other retailers or the general public.
6. 1974 Trade Cas. 96,792 (9th Cir.), petition for rehearing en banc granted,
Civil No. 71-1705 (Dec. 12, 1974).
7. The typical dealer-location clause designates the location of the place of business for which a franchise is issued and requires the franchisor's consent for the franchisee to open a second outlet. See Pollock, Alternative Distribution Methods After
Schwinn, 63 Nw. U.L REv. 595, 603 (1968).
8. 1974 Trade Cas. at 96,795.
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thorized store in an area in which Sylvania considered the market to
be sufficiently developed. Despite Sylvania's objections, Continental
shipped products from its authorized store to the unauthorized store.
In an effort to enforce its dealer-location restrictions, Sylvania refused
to extend further credit to Continental and accelerated prior balances.
Such action had the effect of ending Continentars original franchise and
driving it out of business.9
Continental filed a treble damage antitrust action 0 in federal district court."' In response to the judge's instructions, which interpreted
the scope of Schwinn quite broadly, the jury returned a verdict against
Sylvania.' 2 Sylvania appealed, alleging that the trial judge's instructions were erroneous.
The Ninth Circuit stated that Sylvania had the legal right geographically to space exclusive dealerships' 3 and probably could have
used legal means to prevent Continental from professing to have a second authorized, franchised dealership.' 4 Nevertheless, when Sylvania
attempted to prevent Continental from opening a second outlet by lowering Continental's credit limit and by demanding payment of some accounts receivable, the situation came within the censure of the Schwinn
rule.' 5
The court rejected ,ylvania's contention that, since franchise-location clauses are legal, enforcement of them must likewise be legal,
9. Id. at 96,793.
10. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), provides for treble damage relief in private antitrust actions. Section 4 reads in part: "[Any person who shall
be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws . . . shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee."
11. The action was filed in the District Court for the Northern District of California. Retired United States Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark, sitting by designation,
presided over the trial. John P. McGuire & Co. v. Continental T.V., Inc., Civil No.
44251 TCC (N.D. Cal., Feb. 16, 1971), affirmed sub nom. GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 1974 Trade Cas. 96,792 (9th Cir.), petition for rehearing en bane
granted, Civil No. 71-1705 (Dec. 12, 1974).
12. The judge assumed that Schwinn applied and as a result asked the jury simply:
"Did Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., engage in a contract, combination or conspiracy
in restraint of trade in violation of the antitrust laws with respect to location restrictions
alone?" This charge is quoted in the court of appeals opinion. 1974 Trade Cas. at
96,793.
13. See Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1972). An exclusive
distributorship is established when a manufacturer agrees not to place another distributor
in the initial distributor's territory.
14. The court gave no examples of the legal means at Sylvania's disposal. Presumably these would be based on breach of contract or false advertising theories.
15. 1974 Trade Cas. at 96,794-95.
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or at least not per se illegal. In the majority's view the illegality arose
from the manufacturer's attempts to enforce -the agreement by interfering with Continental's establishment of a second outlet. The court,
however, failed to discuss the issue of conspiracy, a required element
of all section 1 violations. It stated that "absent any anticompetitive
motive and effect" Sylvania could have cancelled Continental's franchise. 6 Such anticompetitive motive and effect were exhibited by Sylvania's intent to limit intrabrand competition by preventing the opening
of Continental's second outlet. 17 The court reasoned that, because Sylvania parted with dominion, risk, and control over the products, under
Schwinn, Continental could resell to unfranchised retailers without Sylvania's approval. The court concluded that "there is no apparent reason why [the antitrust laws] should not also protect the transfer if Continental itself is the retailer."' 8
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court radically changed its attitude toward vertically
imposed territorial and customer resale restraints in United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,' 9 by holding that when a manufacturer sells
his product to a distributor or retailer subject to such restraints, a per
se violation of the Sherman Act results.2 0 According to the Court, after
a manufacturer has transferred title and relinquished dominion over the
product, "it is unreasonable without more" to restrict the areas in which
or the persons with whom a product may be traded. 2 ' Schwinn determined that such restraints had sufficient detrimental effect on intrabrand competition to warrant a strong proscriptive rule. In the Court's
view such a per se rule would foster intrabrand competition.
16. Id. at 96,794.
17. It is necessary to refer to the dissent to discern the meaning of the majority's
conclusion. Judge Ely, dissenting, stated:
The issue is whether a manufacturer-seller can enforce a location clause against
its franchisee by terminating the latter's franchise if he opens an outlet at an
unauthorized location. The majority has not only decided that the manufacturer could not lawfully refuse to sell to the breaching franchisee in this instance, but has also held that a unilateral termination of the franchise in order
to enforce a location clause is a per se violation in restraint of trade.
Id. at 96,796.
18. Id. at 96,795.
19. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
20. Id. at 379. The Court reasoned: "RTo allow this freedom where the manufacturer has parted with dominion over the goods-the usual marketing situation-would
violate the ancient rule against restraints on alienation and open the door to exclusivity
of outlets and limitation of territory further than prudence permits." Id. at 380.
21. Id. at 379.
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The Schwinn rule encourages alternative distribution methods,

some of which are available only to large companies. Chief among
these are consignment programs and vertical integration, both of which
require substantial capital investment.12 The latter method has proved

appealing to many large companies. 23 But practical and legal risks accompanying such business practices often deter their implementation. 24
Moreover, numerous optional distribution plans are at a small company's disposal, thus tending to limit the impact of Schwinn.25
Schwinn has been criticized more for the analysis and principle
used to decide the case than for the result reached. Use of "the ancient rule against restraints on alienation" is better viewed as a conscientious attempt by the Court to create a bright line test in an otherwise
complex area rather than as a correct legal doctrine. 20 Regardless,
easy circumvention of -the Schwinn rule has led many commentators to
question whether Schwinn has accomplished its intended goal-an in22. The government in Schwinn outlined the virtue of vertical integration by noting the cost savings and economies. Brief for the United States at 50. Vertical integration through merger (e.g., Schwinn purchasing an independent distributor's assets) is
treated more leniently than restraints vertically imposed upon distributors because vertical integration is subjected to the rule of reason test. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294 (1962). See Pollock, supra note 7, at 608-09.
23. In fact, vertical integration is what has occurred with Schwinn, in spite of the
fact that the government assured the Supreme Court that forward integration was "unlikely, .... an entirely remote possibility," and "wholly lacking in credibility." Brief for
the United States at 29, 50. See Keck, The Schwinn Case, 23 Bus. LAw. 669, 686-87
(1968); Pollock, supra note 7, at 610.
24. Brown Shoe subjects vertical integration through merger to rule of reason
analysis. See note 22 supra. In addition, it is conceivable that a consignment plan
would be held to transfer to the consignee insufficient "dominion" or "risk" over the
product. Should sufficient transfer be recognized by the court in a particular case, the
overall nature of the plan is still to be given rule of reason consideration. See note 27
infra.
25. Other restrictive practices limiting intrabrand competition but which have been
held not to violate Schwinn are: primary responsibility clauses requiring dealers to concentrate their efforts in particular territories, Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco,
Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973); primary responsibility clauses with a profit pass-over for sales made outside the designated territory, Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta Associates, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1143 (N.D. 111. 1972); and exclusive distributorships, Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors,
Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
26. A noted commentator in the field observes that this can only be classified as
a kind of "instant tradition," where an irrelevant property concept is applied to an antitrust issue. See Pollock, supra note 7, at 601. The words of Emerson are applicable
for the rigid inflexibility of the Schwinn rule. Emerson said, "'Generalization is always
a new influx of the divinity into the mind. Hence the thrill that attends it.'" He refers
to generalizations as the so-called "law" of the "least effort," a common way of breeding
new problems in order to avoid old problems. Quoted in Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d
585, 590 (2d Cir. 1952).
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crease in intrabrand competition.2 7 Various federal courts, realizing
the great impact of the Schwinn per se -rule, have sought to limit the
rule by construing it narrowly. The most serious and legally questionable inroad into Schwinn was made by Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc.,28 in which the Second Circuit declined to apply Schwinn's
per se rule because the manufacturer had not firmly insisted on compliance with the contractual terms that required retailers to restrict their
direct dealings to certain customers. 29 A logical inference from
Janel and similar cases limiting Schwinn is that the lower courts find
27. Schwinn has been criticized because the form of the transaction appears to be
more important than the substance of the transaction. To avoid 'chwinn, a manufacturer needs only retain dominion and control over the product by establishing a consignment or agency plan. Such a plan would subject the manufacturer to the rule of reason
test rather than the per se prohibition. See Pollock, supra note 7, at 610-12; Note, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements After the Schwinn Case, 53 CORNELL L. Rnv. 514

(1968).
28. 396 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 938 (1968).
29. Janel is similar to Sylvania in that enforcement is considered the wrongful act.
Janel reached this result by observing that in Schwinn the Supreme Court had noted that
Schwinn had been "firm and resolute" in insisting on compliance with its restrictive
agreements. 388 U.S. at 372. It seems clear that Schwinn's discussion of such enforcement was designed merely to prove an agreement imposing territorial and customer restrictions. For that reason, Janel is an analytically incorrect limitation of Schwinn.
Janel's limitation was mentioned but not definitely accepted by the Third Circuit in
Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932, 941 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831
(1970). The Tenth Circuit simply followed Janel without adding anything instructive.
Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 987 (1973). A district court in the Second Circuit, Janel's circuit, upheld the
validity of the "firm and resolute exception" but found that Schwinn had nevertheless
been violated. United States v. Eaton Yale & Towne, Inc., 1972 Trade Cas. 91,697 (D.
Conn.). The Second and Tenth Circuits are the only ones that have carved this exception out of the strict Schwinn prohibition.
The Supreme Court appeared to leave open the possibility that exceptions to the
per se rule would be permissible when it stated that "it is unreasonable without more"
for the manufacturer to impose territorial or customer restraints after transferring dominion over the product to the distributor or retailer. 388 U.S. at 379 (emphasis
added). The Third Circuit seized this language to create a "reasonableness exception"
to the Schwinn rule. Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., supra. It is questionable whether
Schwinn permits such an exception. E.g., United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 302 F.
Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1969); see Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3388 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1975). In Coors the Tenth Circuit took
note of the Schwinn rule in striking down territorial restrictions in the distribution of
Coors Beer despite arguments by appellant that the plan was conceived in order to preserve the quality of the product. Id. at 1186. Such a refusal to use the "reasonableness
exception" points out the rigid aspect of the Schwinn rule and is a counterargument that
the rule is not being extensively limited by the lower federal courts. The validity of
the "reasonableness exception" can be inferred from the fact that the Schwinn Court
specifically pointed out that Schwinn was not a newcomer or a failing company and
therefore should be subjected to a per se ruling. 388 U.S. at 374. This implies that
the Court intended to limit the scope of the Schwinn rule in certain instances. The
Ninth Circuit in Sylvania did not accept Sylvania's argument that the "failing-company"
rule applied in the instant case. 1974 Trade Cas. at 96,795-96.
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the strict proscriptive rule of Schwinn unnecessarily harsh and farreaching. In addition, it has been argued that Schwinn unduly emphasized the form over the substance of the transaction by limiting its ruling
to transfers between manufacturers and dealers that pass "dominion"
30
over the product.
The Ninth Circuit in Sylvania failed to recognize and respond to
these criticisms. Instead it continued to emphasize the form of the
transaction by holding that enforcement of dealer-location clauses by
the manufacturer is per se unlawful because such enforcement prevents
the distributor from transferring products and dealing to his second outlet."' Sylvania offered only one reason for including the enforcement
of dealer-location clauses within the proscriptive rule of Schwinn: since
Schwinn guaranteed Continental the right to sell to discounters or other
unauthorized customers, the court saw no apparent reason why the
Sherman Act should not protect the transfer if Continental itself is the
32
retailer.
Such analysis is incomplete, however. First, Schwinn debatably
was not intended to affect dealer-location clauses. In his final decree
in the Schwinn case on remand from the Supreme Court, Judge Perry
specifically authorized Schwinn's use of location clauses in its franchise
agreements.3 8 Since such clauses are not illegal according to the Supreme Court in Schwinn and the Ninth Circuit in Sylvania, it appears
anomalous that enforcement of a location clause would be impermissible. However, the Ninth Circuit concluded that such enforcement if
done with anticompetitive motive and effect is per se illegal. If a manufacturer establishes an exclusive distributorship in one area and then
proceeds to grant distributorships elsewhere he would appear to be under a contractual duty to prevent his distributors from invading the territory of a particular area's exclusive distributor. If this area is invaded,
the dealer could conceivably have an action for breach of contract
against the manufacturer.
Secondly, Sylvania's failure to analyze carefully the substance of
the vertically imposed restraint frustrates the underlying intent of
Schwinn to proscribe only those restraints that unduly interfere with intrabrand competition. By carrying Schwinn to its logical extreme, Syl30.
31.
32.
33.
1968).

See note 27 supra.
See text accompanying note 16 supra.
1974 Trade Cas. at 96,795.
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 291 F. Supp. 564, 566 (N.D. Ill.
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vania avoided the necessary analysis of the anticompetitive effect of

dealer-location clauses as compared with territorial restraints."4 If
dealer-location clauses do not restrain intrabrand competition to the extent that territorial restrictions do, the Ninth Circuit has improperly ex-

tended Schwinn. In addition, since per se rules are created only after
careful analysis of the economic impact of the restraints involved, the

decision in Sylvania is definitely unwarranted.3 5
In light of these criticisms, a better approach to determine the legality of dealer-location clauses would be to examine the cases dealing

with such clauses prior to Schwinn and then to compare the substantive
impact of dealer-location clauses with the substantive effect of vertically
imposed territorial restrictions that were found to be unlawful per se
in Schwinn.30 From the inception of the Sherman Act in 1890 until
Schwinn was decided in 1967, neither territorial resale restrictions nor
dealer-location clauses had been held to be a per se violation of the
antitrust laws. The illegality of vertically imposed territorial resale restraints was clearly established by Schwinn, but the rule of reason remained the appropriate test whenever the manufacturer maintained dominion over the product. Although dealer-location clauses have never
been specifically dealt with by the Supreme Court, such a clause was
upheld by the Second Circuit in Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors
34. Sylvania relied on the customer resale restraint aspect of location clauses to
hold their enforcement per se unlawful; however, calling such restraints customer limitations is at best arguable when what is prevented is solely transfer of products between
two outlets.
35. Ironically, the Supreme Court itself ignored its own earlier admonition when
it established the Schwinn per se rule. The Court had warned in White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), that it did "not know enough of the economic and
business stuff out of which these arrangements emerge" to install a per se rule against
vertically imposed restraints. Id. at 263. The Schwinn Court established a per se
rule following no analysis of interbrand competition. Since per se rules normally are
pronounced after careful economic analysis of the involved restraint, such analysis
should by necessity include the possibility of overall benefits to competition. See Bork,
The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74
YALE L.J. 775 (1965).
36. A third type of restraint, an exclusive distributorship, is invariably sought by
the distributor to give him a chance to infiltrate an area with advertising and to establish
a clientele. The distributor often needs such protection to make the initial fixed costs
worthwhile. An adverse effect on intrabrand competition results when the distributor
is given an exclusive distributorship; however, retailers in that area are not restricted,
since they do not have to deal with the exclusive distributor. Exclusive distributorships
have never been considered unlawful, even following Schwinn. See note 25 supra. In
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944), the Supreme Court
specifically refused to outlaw exclusive distributorships as violative of the antitrust laws.
See also Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957).
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Corp.37 as not being an "unreasonable interference with competition.""8
Prior to Schwinn there had been little litigation over dealer-location
clauses because they had been held to be subject to rule of reason analysis. Because of similarities with territorial resale restrictions, the situation regarding dealer-location restrictions, however, has become unsettled as a result of Schwinn.
Dealer-location restrictions resemble territorial restrictions in some
respeots. A territorial restriction prevents a distributor from selling the
manufacturer's product to a retailer outside a prescribed area. If a
manufacturer is careful not to have the territories of the dealers overlap, he can effectively prevent intrabrand competition. The situation
is similar to that involving dealer-location restrictions except that, instead of being careful not to have the territories of his dealers overlap,
the manufacturer must take pains to space his distributors. If the manufacturer spaces his distributors, intrabrand competition will be checked
only to the extent that transportation costs and retailer knowledge of
existing distributors make it inconvenient or economically unwise for
a retailer to purchase from the distributor who is not the nearest one
to the retailer's shop.
Dealer-location restrictions, however, have two crucial characteristics that make them less anticompetitive than territorial restrictions.
First, a dealer-location restriction does not prevent a distributor from
selling to a retailer located outside the distributor's zone. 39 If a distributor wants to compete with other distributors by cutting his price,
he can make it feasible for a distant retailer to deal with him rather
than with the closer distributor. Territorial restrictions on the other
hand preclude intrabrand competition since they place all retailers in
specific distribution areas and prevent the distributor from selling to
those not within his territory. Secondly, even when the manufacturer
carefully spaces his distributors, there will normally be retailers who are
as far from one distributor as from another. This will usually be the
37. 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir.), rehearing denied, 130 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943). The Supreme Court was faced with the issue of dealerlocation clauses in United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966), but
avoided the question by deciding the case on "classic conspiracy" grounds. The government had requested a ruling on the legality of location clauses; however, the Court refused. The dissent in Sylvania incorrectly concluded that this is evidence of the Court's
intention to permit such clauses. 1974 Trade Cas. at 96,799. It appears, rather, that
the Court merely avoided an issue that it did not have to decide.
38. 124 F.2d at 823.
39. Specific territories are not set out by the manufacturer when he carefully
spaces distributorships; however, a zone of convenient operations is established in effect.
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case whenever the manufacturer does not draw the zones by imposing
territorial restrictions but instead relies on carefully spaced distributorships to bring about a similar effect. In short, dealer-location clauses
do not totally prevent two distributors from competing for the same retailers. Since such restrictions are not so anticompetitive as territorial

resale restraints, the Schwinn rule, designed to foster intrabrand competition, should not be applicable. Enforcement of dealer-location clauses

would be more properly examined under the rule of reason.
Even assuming that the restraint involved in Sylvania is as anticompetitive as territorial restrictions and that the enforcement of dealer-

location clauses should be unlawful per se, there are still serious problems with the court's decision. First, the finding of a conspiracy is an
essential element in all cases based on section 1 of the Sherman Act.4°
The court failed to examine the issue of conspiracy. 41 Had it done so,
it would have found that the Sylvania fact situation is distinguishable

from Schwinn as far as the conspiracy factor is concerned.

The agree-

ment between the manufacturer and the distributor formed the nucleus

of the conspiracy in Schwinn.
The Ninth Circuit in Sylvania agreed
with the intrinsic legality of dealer-location clauses and thus was arguably foreclosed from concluding that the various contracts between Sylvania and its distributors formed the foundation of 'the conspiracy. 3
The manufacturer was the only party interested in the enforcement of
the location clause, and such enforcement by the manufacturer seems
nothing more than unilateral action." The court's decision to allow
40. See note 4 supra.
41. The dissent asserted that a conspiracy did not exist in the case. 1974 Trade
Cas. at 96,798. The dissent accurately observed that it was impossible to find Sylvania's
agent as the necessary partner in the conspiracy since the jury responded to a special
interrogatory that the agent did not engage with Sylvania in a contract, combination,
or conspiracy. Id. at 96,798 n.7.
42. 388 U.S. at 378.
43. Conforming dealers often favor the location clause and, as such, reap its benefits by not having other dealers invade their territories. It is arguable that their acquiesbence and adherence to the plan form the basis of a tacit conspiracy. See Albrecht
v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
44. It is possible that such unilateral action could be reached under section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970), now that the Supreme Court has sanctioned the use of section 5 for the purpose of prohibiting conduct
which is inherently "unfair," even though not specifically violative of any other section
of the antitrust laws. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972).
This would be true even if the Supreme Court should hold in the future that such conduct as that which existed in Janel and Sylvania is unilateral. Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act gives the FTC jurisdiction to declare unlawful "[u]nfair methods
of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce
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dealer-location clauses but not to permit their enforcement appears inconsistent with the rule set out in Schwinn. Schwinn itself draws no
such distinction. Often the mere agreement is sufficient to gain the
anticompetitive effect-for example, when all dealers willingly comply
with such a clause to benefit from the limiting of intrabrand competition.
Secondly, Sylvania specifically stated that Sylvania could have cancelled Continental's franchise "absent any anticompetitive motive and
effect, '45 a statement -that places the courts in the precarious position
of having to determine motive. A manufacturer could easily disguise
his motive and terminate the distributor's franchise. The anticompetitive effect resulting from a distributor's failure even ,to attempt to open
a second outlet is similar to that which results from a manufacturer's
preventing the attempted opening of a second outlet. This similarity
is especially true when a distributor does not attempt to open a second
outlet because he fears the opening of second outlets in his area by
other distributors. Determination of motive is especially difficult since
the court noted that, "if Sylvania later decided it didn't like Continental's locations and ceased selling to it, presumably there would be nothing illegal about it."' 46 The court's requirement of enforcement of the
contraotual restraint appears unsound both legally and practically.
When coupled with -the frequent necessity for analysis of motive, the
rule as set out in Sylvania appears to be highly unworkable.
CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit in Sylvania erroneously extended Schwinn under the mistaken belief that it was following the Supreme Court's directive in Schwinn. Lower federal courts have attempted to limit
Schwinn 7 The Ninth Circuit should have considered cases such as
Janel and limited Schwinn to territorial restrictions. Such consideration
could easily have been done since an examination of the effect of
dealer-location clauses would have shown that the detrimental effect
on intrabrand competition is not so great as with vertically imposed territorial restraints.
Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting in Schwinn, warned against the ef45. 1974 Trade Cas. at 96,794.
46. Id. at 96,795 (emphasis added). Use of the plural "locations" implies that the
manufacturer can cancel the distributor's whole franchise because of the second outlet's
existence. This appears quite contradictory indeed.
47. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
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fect of such a per se rule as possibly leading to the elimination of many
small independent competitors. 48 The situation in Sylvania corresponds with that concern. By 1962 Sylvania's share of the television
market had declined to one or two percent. The new distribution policy had helped it increase its share to five percent in 1965. 4 1 Even
though it is controlled by General Telephone and Electronics Corporation, Sylvania has never been a giant in the television industry.
The antitrust laws were initially enacted to prevent monopolies by
a few large companies. It is certain that the underlying purpose of the
antitrust laws is not being served when interbrand competition is sacrificed to encourage intrabrand competition.5 ° The Schwinn rule should
only be applied to territorial resale restraints and other restraints that
have a similar effect of dividing markets and limiting intrabrand competition. Dealer-location clauses are not such restraints.
JOHN GALE

Constitutional Law-Presidential Pardons and the Connon Law
The Constitution states that "[t]he President shall . . have
Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United
States, except in Cases of Impeachment."' In Schick v. Reed' the
United States Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether
the commutation of a death sentence to a sentence of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole was a valid exercise of the President's
pardoning power.3 A divided Court 4 upheld the validity of this commutation, concluding that the power granted the President under article
II, section 2, includes the power to substitute for the sentence imposed
by the trial court another type of sentence not specifically provided for
by statute. 5 In so holding, the Court extended the scope of the Presi48. 388 U.S. at 394.
49. 1974 Trade Cas. at 96,793.
50. See note 35 supra.
1. U.S. CONsT. art. H, § 2.

2. 95 S. Ct. 379 (1974).
3. Id. at 382.

4. Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion. Justices Marshall, Douglas,
and Brennan dissented in an opinion written by Justice Marshall. Id. at 386.
5. Id. at 384.
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dent's pardoning power beyond its previous judicially recognized

boundaries and beyond the scope of its English common-law counterpart.
Petitioner Maurice L. Schick was tried for murder in 1954 while
serving in the United States Army.' In the face of conflicting psychiatric testimony, the court-martial rejected his defense of insanity and
sentenced him to death. 7 After an Army Board of Review and the
Court of Military Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence," his
On
case was forwarded for final review to President Eisenhower.
imprisonMarch 25, 1960, the President commuted his sentence to life
ment, on the express condition that he never be eligible for parole. 10
Schick received a dishonorable discharge from the Army and was transferred to the federal penitentiary at Lewisberg, Pennsylvania, to serve
his life sentence.1 1
In 1971 Schick brought suit in the federal District Court for the
District of Columbia to require the United States Board of Parole to
consider him for parole. 12 He argued that the annexation of the noparole condition to his commutation was an invalid exercise of the presidential pardoning power. The court rejected his claim and granted
the Government's motion for summary judgment.13 Before the court
6. Id. at 381.
7. Schick was sentenced pursuant to Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 118,
Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, § 1, 64 Stat. 140 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 918 (1970)),
which prescribed death and life imprisonment (with the possibility of parole) as the alternative punishments for premeditated murder, the choice being left up to the courtmartial.
8. See United States v. Schick, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 419, 22 C.M.R. 209 (1956).
9. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 71(a), Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169,
§ 1, 64 Stat. 131 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1970)), required the President to
review all military sentences and authorized him to "approve the sentence or such part,
amount, or commuted form of the sentence as he sees fit ..
10. The President's order stated:
"[P]ursuant to the authority vested in me as President of the United States
by Article II, Section 2, Clause 1, of the Constitution, the sentence to be put
to death is thereby commuted to dishonorable discharge . . . and confinement
at hard labor for the term of his . . . natural life. This commutation of sentence is expressly made on the condition that the said Maurice L. Schick shall
never have any rights, privileges, claims or benefits arising under the parole
and suspension or remission of sentence laws of the United States . .. .
95 S. Ct. at 381. As the dissent noted, "Confinement without opportunity for parole
is unknown to military law." Id. at 389 n.11. The establishment of a parole system
for offenders in military correctional facilities is authorized by 10 U.S.C. § 952 (1970).
11. 95 S. Ct. at 381.
12. Id. Under the federal parole statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1970), which was applicable to Schick because he was imprisoned in a federal institution, a prisoner may
be released on parole after serving one-third of a definite-term sentence or fifteen years
of a life sentence.
13. 95 S. Ct. at 381.
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of appeals heard the case, the Supreme Court decided in Furman v.
Georgia1 4 that death sentences imposed at the discretion of a jury are

unconstitutional.' 5

Because the imposition of the death penalty had

been within the discretion of the court-martial, 1 Schick argued that
Furman should be applied retroactively to his case, thus requiring the
imposition of the only legal alternative punishment, life imprisonment,
with attendant eligibility for parole consideration.' 7 Schick also argued
that the President had exceeded his authority in granting the conditional commutation.' 8 The court of appeals rejected both arguments

and affirmed the decision of the district court. 19
The Supreme Court likewise affirmed.20 The majority was unpersuaded by Schick's argument concerning the retroactivity of Fur-

man. It reasoned that since his death sentence had been commuted
in 1960, he was not under a death penalty at the time Furman was
decided and thus that decision could provide him no relief. 2 '

The Court devoted most of its opinion to an examination of the
constitutional validity of Schick's conditional commutation. In interpreting the meaning of the pardon power under the Constitution, the
Court relied heavily on the history of the pardoning power in England

prior to the drafting of the Constitution 22 and on the Court's previous
interpretations of its scope in this country.

It concluded that the par-

doning power granted the President was meant to be unfettered by any
legislative enactments2 3 and held that this power inescapably included
the right to commute a death sentence to life imprisonment without
14. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
15. Id. at 240.
16. See note 7 supra.
17. Schick v. Reed, 483 F.2d 1266, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
18. Id. at 1268.
19. Id. at 1270. Judge Skelly Wright dissented on the ground that Furman should
be retroactively applied here, thereby invalidating the death sentence and its later commutation. Id. at 1271.
20. 95 S. Ct. at 386.
21. Id. at 382. The dissenters, however, believed that Furman required the eradication of all adverse consequences of an unconstitutionally imposed death sentence.
Since the punishment substituted by the commutation was more severe than the statute's
only alternative, the dissent considered the conditional commutation to be an adverse
consequence that Furman required to be voided. Id. at 387.
22. The Court observed that "[tihe history of our executive pardoning power reveals a consistent pattern of adherence to the English common law practice." id. at
383. The similarity in the English and American prerogatives was intended by the constitutional draftsmen, who "were well acquainted with the English crown authority to
alter and reduce punishments as it existed in 1787." Id. at 382.
23. Id. at 385.
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eligibility for parole,24 even though the latter was not authorized by
25
statute.
The power of the Crown to pardon is deeply rooted in English history, some say tracing back to the Teutonic tribes. 20 By the time of
Henry VIII, the pardoning power was absolutely and exclusively vested
He had great latitude in exercising this power; Coke
in the King.
repbrted that his pardon could be "either absolute, or under condition,
exception, o'r qualification ...

*"28

This flexibility ensured the King

an unrestricted ability to bestow mercy. According to Coke, "A pardon
is a work of mercy, whereby the king either before attainder, sentence,
or conviction, or after, forgiveth any crime, offence, punishment, execution, right, title, debt or duty, temporall or ecclesiasticall ..... 1 Its
exercise was seen as being noble, for, as Coke stated, "[m]ercy and
truth preserve the king, and by clemency is his throne strengthened."30
With little modification the constitutional draftsmen brought the
pardoning power of the executive to this country. Because there was
not much debate at the Constitutional Convention over the inclusion
of the pardoning clause, 3 ' it appears that the delegates intended this
power of the President to be similar to that power of the English Crown
with which they were familiar.3 2 Writing in The Federalist No. 74
shortly after the Convention, Hamilton justified the granting of this
power on the grounds that "one man appears to be a more eligible dispenser of the mercy of the government than a body of men. 3 Clearly
he and the other framers shared the English view of the pardon as being an act of mercy. Terming the pardoning power a "benign prerogative," Hamilton wrote, "The criminal code of every country partakes
24. Id. at 384.
25. See note 7 supra.
26. C. JENSEN, THE PARDONING POWER IN THE AMERICAN STATES 1 (1922).
27. In 1535, Parliament enacted the following law: "'That no person or persons,
of what estate or degree soever they be. . . shall have any power or authority to pardon
or remit any treasons, murders, manslaughters or any felonies whatsoever they be...
but that the king's highness, his heirs and successors, kings of the realm, shall have the
Grupp, Some Historical Aspects
whole and sole power and authority thereof . . . ."'
of the Pardon in England, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 51, 55 (1963), quoting An Act for

Recontinuing Liberties in the Crown, 27 Hen. 8, c.24 (1535).
28. E. COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 233
(1817).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., 2 M. FAIURAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 626 (1911).
32. Schick v. Reed, 95 S. Ct. 379, 382 (1974).
33. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 500 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
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so much of necessary severity, that without an easy access to exceptions
in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too san'34
guinary and cruel.
Chief Justice Marshall gave judicial recognition to the view that
a pardon was an act of mercy. Writing for the Court in United States
v. Wilson,3 5 he defined pardon as "an act of grace proceeding from the
power intrusted with the execution of the laws .
*"36
Marshall also
stressed the similarity between the English and the American forms of
pardoning power and asserted the need to look to the common law for
guidance:
As this power has been exercised from time immemorial by the executive of that nation whose language is our language, and to whose
judicial institutions ours bear a close resemblance, we adopt the
principles respecting the operation and effect of a pardon, and look
into their books for the rules prescribing the manner in which it
37
is to be used by the person who would avail himself of it.
After Wilson the trend of the courts in this country was to view
the granting of a pardon as a personal act of mercy bestowed upon an
individual by the President. 8 When questions arose concerning the
nature of this power, courts turned to principles developed at common
law.
The Supreme Court abandoned this historical approach in 1927
with Biddle v. Perovich.3 9 In an opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes, the
Court stated that a pardon was an act for the public welfare, "not a
private act of grace from an individual happening to possess power."4 0
It rested its conclusion concerning the nature of a pardon on logic rather
than on common-law principles or on concepts existing at the time the
41
Constitution was drafted.
One manifestation of this non-historical approach in Biddle was
the Court's use of the terms "commutation" and "pardon" without
drawing any distinction between them. Traditionally, the concepts have
34. Id.
35. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833).
36. Id. at 160.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866).
39. 274 U.S. 480 (1927). In this case the petitioner argued that the presidential
commutation of his sentence from death to life imprisonment was invalid because it was
imposed without his consent. The Court upheld the commutation.
40. Id. at 486.
41. The Court announced this departure from the historical approach by stating,
"We will not go into history. . . ." Id.
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been viewed as completely different forms of clemency. 42 A pardon is
a reduction of punishment that requires acceptance by the prisoner to
be effective.43 A commutation, on the other hand, is a "substitution of a
punishment of a different character for that which has been awarded
by the court."" Unlike a pardon, it does not require acceptance by
the prisoner and can be imposed upon him against his will."5
Biddle disregarded the technical meaning of these terms. It
reasoned that as long as the substituted sentence was one commonly
recognized as being less severe, the prisoner "on no sound principle
ought to have any voice in what the law should do for the welfare of
the whole."146 With this statement the Court discarded the long-stand47
ing requirement of prisoner consent.
The Court's statement in Schick that "the requirement of consent
was a legal fiction at best"' 48 shows that the majority shared the views
expressed in Biddle. However, the Court did not rely on Biddle in
reaching its conclusion. Rather, it stated that this conclusion was
"inescapable" "[i]n light of the English common law." 49 In fact, the
decision misconstrued the common law.
The distinction between these two forms of clemency was important at common law. According to Maitland, although the King possessed the power to pardon, he could not commute sentences. ° He was
able to avoid this disability, however, by granting conditional pardons."
The English law officers Alexander Cockburn and Sir Richard Bethell
explained this limitation on the King's powers in an 1854 opinion as
follows:
"The Crown has no power, except when such a power is expressly given by Act of Parliament, to commute a sentence passed
by a court of justice. Practically, indeed, commutation of punishment has long taken place under the form of conditional pardons.
42. See, e.g., Lee v. Murphy, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 789 (1872).
43. Id. at 798.
44. Brett, Conditional Pardons and the Commutation of Death Sentences, 20
MOD. L. REv. 131 (1957).
45. Lee v. Murphy, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 789, 798 (1872).
46. 274 U.S. at 487.
47. Learned Hand did not share Holmes' view on this matter. Dissenting in
United States ex rel. Brazier v. Commissioner of Immigration, 5 F.2d 162 (2d Cir.
1924), Hand said, "[A] pardon, like a deed, must be accepted to be valid at all." Id.
at 166. He thought that a commutation was necessarily invalid because "the President
may not change the lawful sentence of a court except by reducing it." Id.
48. 95 S. Ct. at 383.
49. Id. at 384.
50. F. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HIsTORY OF ENGLAND 480 (1955).
51. Id.
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For the Crown, having by the prerogative the power of pardon,
may annex to a pardon such conditions as it pleases. Thus for offenses for which the punishment was death, where it was not
deemed advisable to carry the sentence of death into execution, the
course, from an early period, was to grant a pardon on condition
of the convict being transported to some settlement or plantation.
"But this could only be done with the consent of the felon.
The Crown cannot compel a man, against his will, to submit to a
different punishment from52 that which has been awarded against
him in due course of law."
Based on this statement of the law, Cockburn and Bethell ruled that
the commutation of a sentence by the Governor of Barbados was in53
valid.
Early American courts also recognized the distinction between the
two forms of clemency and the necessity for consent. For example,
in Ex parte Wells54 the Supreme Court relied on the consent requirement to uphold the validity of conditional pardons. The Court
reasoned that, since the prisoner was required to accept a pardon for
it to be effective, he, rather than the President, was imposing the new
punishment.5 5 Schick's citation of that case to support its conclusion that
"the pardoning power was intended to include the power to commute
sentences"'5 6 illustrates its misinterpretation of the traditional views of
the pardoning power.
Schick also went beyond Biddle in holding that a President may
57
impose on a prisoner a punishment not already authorized by law.
Biddle, although expanding the scope of the pardoning power to include commutations, did not go so far as to hold that the President had
unlimited freedom in substituting punishments.58 In fact, commentators have viewed that case as "indicat[ing] that by substituting a commutation order for a deed of pardon, a President can always have his
way in such matters, provided the substituted penalty is authorized by
law and does not 'in common understanding exceed the original
penalty.' ,,r0
52. Brett, supra note 44, at 136-37 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 137. "The legal reputations of Cockbum and Bethell are such that their
opinions must command the greatest respect. And this is the more so when, as in the
present instance, the opinion conforms to the accepted principles of English constitutional law." Id.
54. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307 (1855).
55. Id. at 315.
56. 95 S. Ct. at 384.
57. Id.
58. See Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1927).
59. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA-ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 475 (1973) (emphasis added).
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Schick, however, concluded that only the Constitution limited the
President and that to require him to substitute a punishment already
authorized by law would place congressional restrictions on his pardoning power.60 While the draftsmen of the Constitution clearly expressed
the view that the pardoning power should not be "'fettered or embarrassed,' "61 the context in which they made the statement suggests that
they were referring to the President's freedom to exercise his power,
rather than his freedom to impose new punishments. 62 Hamilton said
that the "benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible
fettered or embarrassed" because he believed that there should be "an
easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt."6 3 In other
words, he felt that the kinds of cases over which the President could
exercise his pardon should not be unduly restricted. He did not, however, express a view as to the types of punishments the President might
impose.
There is little authority either at common law or in the American
courts concerning the nature of the conditions that can be attached to
a pardon. The most frequent statement of the courts is that the condition can not be illegal, immoral, or impossible to perform. 4 One
American court elaborated on this limitation by saying: "[The condition] must not be impossible, immoral or illegal. It is clear that
[the governor] is authorized to substitute, with the consent of the
prisoner, any punishment recognized by statute or the common law as
enforced in this state." 5 One of the few decisions concerning the Executive's freedom to select a punishment not authorized by law was the
case of the commutation by the Governor of Barbados, referred to
above.66 In that case the law officers Cockburn and Bethell not only
ruled that the order was invalid because it was a commutation, but they
also ruled that even had it been a conditional pardon, it would have
been invalid.6 7 The ground for this latter assertion of invalidity was
that the Governor had substituted a prison sentence of nine years,
whereas the law under which the prisoner was convicted authorized a
60. 95 S. Ct. at 385.
61. Id. at 384, quoting THEF EtnAisr No. 74, at 500 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A.
Hamilton).
62. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, supranote 33, at 500.
63. Id.

64. C. JENsEN, supra note 26, at 127.
65. Lee v. Murphy, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 789, 802 (1872) (emphasis added).
66. See text accompanying notes 52-53 supra.
67. Brett, supra note 44, at 137.
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maximum prison term of four years.6 8
Schick wanted to avoid the restriction of the President's pardoning
power by Congress. However, in doing so, the Court allowed the executive branch to exercise powers that were vested in Congress. The
Court had previously stated that "the authority to define and fix the
punishment for crime is legislative . . . and . . . the right to relieve
from punishment, fixed by law and ascertained according to methods
by it provided, belongs to the executive department." 69 More recently
the Court stated that "[t]he punishment appropriate for the diverse
federal offenses is a matter for the discretion of Congress .... "170
The Court could have permitted both branches to exercise their given
functions, had it recognized the right of Congress to define the outer
boundaries of the President's pardoning power.
In light of this intrusion of the executive branch into the legislative
domain, it is unfortunate that Schick did not clarify the actual basis for
its holding. The Court announced that its decision was grounded in
the "history of the English pardoning power. '71 Nevertheless, an examination of the decision shows that the Court's conclusions deviated
from the common-law principles significantly. Rather than attempting
to invoke the common law, the Court could have openly announced that
it was abandoning an historical approach and was basing its decision
on currently existing conditions. The Court then could have proceeded
to enumerate the considerations upon which it based its conclusion that
the President has the right to prescribe and impose punishments on individuals without either the prisoners' consent or the Congress' authorization. Such an approach would have illuminated both the scope of
the President's pardoning power and the nature of his relation to
Congress.
S. ELIZABETH GIBSON

Constitutional Law-Procedural Due Process in Prison Disciplinary Proceedings-The Supreme Court Responds
Most correctional systems reduce an inmate's sentence as a reward for serving periods of his confinement without incurring dis68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916).
Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 82 (1955).
95 S.CL at 385.
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ciplinary sanctions.1 These same correctional systems often revoke
this "good-time" credit as punishment for major violations of prison
rules. 2 Alternatively, prison authorities may restrict the inmate to a
disciplinary cell-commonly known as solitary confinement.3
In Wolff v. McDonnella the United States Supreme Court recently
determined that the imposition of either of these punishments is so
serious a deprivation of liberty that the inmate must be accorded the
constitutional protections of due process.5 In so ruling the Court also
prescribed the minimum procedural safeguards necessary to satisfy
due process in prison disciplinary proceedings. 6 Even though this
decision appears to enhance prisoners' rights, the minimum procedures required in Wolff may not be sufficient to prevent arbitrary
action by state prison authorities.
THE CASE
Robert 0. McDonnell, an inmate at a Nebraska prison, filed a
complaint on behalf of himself and other inmates for damages and
injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. He alleged that the
prison's disciplinary procedures, which might result in confinement
in a disciplinary cell or loss of good-time, violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.7
1. Note, ProceduralDue Process in Prison Disciplinary Actions, 2 LOYOLA U. or
CHICAGO LJ. 110, 111 &n.8 (1971).
2. See, e.g., N.C. STATE CORCTIONS SERVICE, GUIDEBOOK § 2-408(b) (3)
[hereinafter cited as GUIDEBOOk].
3. Note, 2 LOYOLA U. OF CHiCAGO LJ., supra note 1, at 111. "This 'prison within
a prison' usually is a place of solitary confinement, sometimes without bedding or toilet
facilities, accompanied by reduced diet and limited access to reading materials or other
diversions, and occasionally without any kind of light." THE UNITED STATES PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND

ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE, TASK

FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 50 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CORRECTIONS].
4. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
5. Id. at 558, 571-72 n.19.
6. Id. at 563-72. In recent years the question of what procedural safeguards are
demanded in prison disciplinary proceedings has occupied the time of many lower federal courts and has produced a variety of results. See, e.g., Clutchette v. Procunier, 497
F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974); Meyers v. Alldredge, 492 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1974); Braxton
v. Carlson, 483 F.2d 933 (3d Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479
F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972); Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062 (M.D. Fla. 1973);
Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971); Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp.
165 (D. Md. 1971).
7. In addition, McDonnell alleged that the inmate legal assistance program did
not meet constitutional standards and that the regulations governing inmates' mall were
unconstitutionally restrictive. 418 U.S. at 543. This note will not deal with the issues
raised by these allegations.
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The district court denied relief,8 but the Eighth Circuit Court of

Appeals reversed9 on the due process claim.

The court of appeals

held that due process rights must be provided and that the procedural

safeguards for parole revocations and for probation revocations set
out by the Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer 0 and in Gagnon
v. Scarpelli"l were generally applicable to disciplinary proceedings

within the prison.' 2
Pursuant to a petition for certiorari,' 3 the Supreme Court affirmed in part the court of appeal's decision. The Court agreed that
due process rights attached,

4

but declined to follow the court of ap-

peals and adopt the full range of procedures established by Morrissey and Gagnon.15 Instead, the Court felt that the "closed, tightly

controlled environment" in which prison disciplinary proceedings take
place, the special security problems of prisons, and the necessity for
flexibility in the correctional process warranted reduced procedures'

6

and thus held that due process required only that an inmate be
given: (1) notice of the charges and a brief period of at least twen8. McDonnell v. Wolff, 342 F. Supp. 616, 628 (D. Neb. 1972). The district
court relied on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Morrissey v. Brewer, 443
F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), denying due process in parole
revocation proceedings. Subsequent to the district court's decision in McDonnell but
prior to court of appeals action, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Eighth
Circuit in Morrissey and held that due process was required in the parole revocation
situation.
9. McDonnell v. Wolff, 483 F.2d 1059, 1062-63 (8th Cir. 1973).
10. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
11. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
12. The court of appeals remanded the case to allow the district court to determine
whether Nebraska's procedures met due process and to grant the permissible relief. 483
F.2d at 1064. The court of appeals held that the restoration of good-time credits under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) was foreclosed under Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475
(1973), but suggested that any determinations of misconduct made in proceedings which
failed to comport with due process could be expunged from prison records. 483 F.2d
at 1064. The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals about Preiser'sforeclosure
of restoration of good-time credits as a remedy under section 1983. 418 U.S. at 555.
However, the Court disagreed with and reversed the court of appeal's application of due
process retroactively that would have allowed the expunging of the prison record. Id.
at 573 The Court said,
Despite the fact that procedures are related to the integrity of the fact-finding
process, in the context of disciplinary proceedings, where less is generally at
stake for an individual than at a criminal trial, great weight should be given
to the significant impact a retroactivity ruling would have on the administration of all prisons in the country, and the reliance prison officials placed, in
good faith, on prior law not requiring such procedures.
Id. at 573-74.
13. Wolff v. McDonnell, 414 U.S. 1156 (1974).
14. 418 U.S. at 558.
15. Id. at 560.
16. Id. at 560-63.
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ty-four hours to prepare a defense; 17 (2) the opportunity "to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional
safety or correctional goals";' 8 and (3) "a 'written statement of the
factfindings as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons' for the
disciplinary action taken."' 9 The Court specifically denied inmates
the rights of confrontation and cross-examination 20 and the aid of
either retained or appointed counsel. 21 However, the Court did require substitute aid by fellow inmates or staff personnel-at least
"[w]here an illiterate inmate is involved . . . or where the com-

plexity of the issue makes it unlikely that the inmate will be able to
collect and present the evidence necessary for an adequate comprehension of the case ...

*22

Finally, the Court held that hearing

boards composed solely of prison officials could be sufficiently impartial to satisfy due process.2
THE REQUIREMENT OF DUE PRocEss

Today, it is axiomatic that inmates in state institutions continue
to enjoy many constitutional protections, including due process of law,
after incarceration.24 The question in Wolff, therefore, was not
whether prisoners retain the protections of due process generally, but
whether the protections of the due process clause extend to proceedings in which prisoners may be confined in a disciplinary cell or
lose good-time credits.2
The general standard for determining when due process rights
attach has been first to determine whether the private interest that
is to be adversely affected is a protected interest and, if so, to determine if loss of the interest will be "grievious." Once it is clear that
17. Id. at 564.
18. Id. at 566.
19. Id. at 564, quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
20. Id. at 567-68.
21. Id. at 570.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 571.
24. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam) (religious freedom);
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam) (due process); Wilwording v.
Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) (per curiam) (due process); Younger v. Gilmore, 404
U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam) (access to the courts); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483
(1969) (access to the courts); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam)
(protection against invidious discrimination); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per
curiam) (religious freedom).
25. 418 U.S. at 557.
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the individual stands to suffer a grievous injury to a protected
interest, due process rights must be granted unless, on balance, the
governmental interest in summary proceedings outweighs the possible
26
lOSS.

Applying the general standard, the Wolff Court conceded that goodtime credit is not constitutionally required but instead is a state-created
right.2 7 Nevertheless, the Court felt that once the state had given the
right, "the prisoner's interest has real substance and is .

.

. em-

braced within Fourteenth Amendment 'liberty' ..
"..28
Having
found a protected interest, the Court held that "[tihe deprivation of
good-time is unquestionably a matter of considerable importance"29
and that the deprivation was sufficient, on balance, to require the
protections of due process.30 In the case of confinement in a disciplinary cell the Court held, "as in the case of good-time, there should
be minimum procedural safeguards as a hedge against arbitrary determination of the factual predicate for imposition of the sanction." 1
The Court reached this decision because it felt the "major change in
the conditions of confinementf '' 2 that accompanies solitary confinement is "difficult for the purposes of procedural due process to distinguish . . . [from when] . . . good-time is forfeited ...
.
Arguably, the Court's reasoning will also reach other penalties
imposed for serious misbehavior 34 such as revocation of a parole release date 35 or reduction of a conduct "grade."36 The revocation or
modification of a parole release date may postpone an inmate's release on parole and, thereby, increase his time of confinement. A
reduction in a conduct "grade" could result in a significant change in
the conditions of confinement by causing transfer to a more maxi26. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
27. 418 U.S. at 557.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 561.
30. Id. at 557.
31. Id. at 571 n.19.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 581 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
35. Parole release dates are dates, set by statute, upon which an imnate becomes
eligible to have his case for parole heard. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-58 (Supp.
1974).
36. The North Carolina corrections system provides for the classification of prisoners on the basis of conduct as either "honor" grade, "A" grade, or "B" grade and for
the reduction of grade as punishment for "major" misconduct. GuIDEBOOm, supra note
2, §§ 2-101, -408(4).
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mum security institution and by terminating the inmate's eligibility
for work-release programs or other activities outside the prison. 37
The inmate's interest in avoiding either of these penalties seems to be
of sufficient substance to require due process before their imposi38

tion.

THE ELEMENTS OF

DuE PROCESS

"[D]ue process is flexible and calls [only] for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands."3'9 In Wolff the Supreme Court declined to apply the Morrissey-Gagnon procedures for
prison disciplinary proceedings. 40 This decision was based on a perceived distinction between disciplinary proceedings and parole and
probation revocations and on the unique "stake the State has in the
structure and content of the prison disciplinary hearing."'"
The distinction between revocation proceedings and disciplinary
proceedings lies in the immediacy of the loss to be suffered.4 2 While
the revocation of parole or probation will result in the immediate loss
of freedom and the return to prison, "[t]he deprivation [of good-time]
.. .does not then and there work any change in the conditions of
[the prisoner's] liberty. It can postpone the date of eligibility for
parole and extend the maximum term to be served, but it is not
certain to do so, for good-time may be restored. 43 With respect to
the revocation of good-time, a reduction in the required procedures
may be justified on the basis of this distinction. However, a reduction in procedures seems less justified when the punishment imposed
is confinement in a disciplinary cell. In this situation, the loss is
just as immediate and, arguably, just as serious as the revocation of
parole or probation.
The state's interest in maintaining order within its prisons and
"in furthering the institutional goal of modifying the behavior and
value systems of prison inmates sufficiently to permit them to live
37. Prisoners in the North Carolina corrections system are eligible for work-release
privileges only while they maintain "honor" grade. Id. § 3-201.
38. In Jackson v. Wise, 43 U.S.L.W. 2272 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 1974), a federal
district court held that due process is required before an inmate's parole release date can
be rescinded or modified in a prison disciplinary proceeding.
39. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
40. 418 U.S. at 560.
41. Id. at 561.
42. Id. at 560-61.
43. Id. at 561.
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within the law when they are released .

. . ."

799

is the major reason

given by the Court for not adopting the Morrissey-Gagnon procedures. 44 The validity of this rationale can be effectively analyzed
only in conjunction with a discussion of each of the procedural safeguards required in Morrissey and Gagnon.
Written Notice of the Claimed Violations
Wolff required "that written notice of the charges must be given
to the disciplinary-action defendant in order to inform him of the
charges and to enable him to marshall the facts and prepare a defense. ' 45 To insure that the ability to prepare a defense is not denied
de facto, the Court also required that "a brief period of time after the
notice, no less than 24 hours, should be allowed to the inmate to prepare . ...

One purpose of notice is to clarify the charges, 47 and it is questionable whether written notice of a named violation, without more,
will satisfy this objective. Some correctional systems presently punish inmates for violations such as "agitation" and the use of "profane, contemptuous or threatening" language. 48 An inmate charged
with such conduct is often unaware of the factual nature of the wrongdoing with which he is charged. A solution that would enable an inmate, upon receipt of notice, better to understand both the nature
and implications of the charge lodged against him would be to require that inmates be given, upon entering prison, a written, unambiguous delineation of the acts that constitute violations of prison
rules and regulations and of the punishments that may be imposed
for such acts. Arguably, due process compels this procedure to avoid
vagueness. 40 The further step by prison authorities of providing all
incoming inmates with an orientation to prison rules and regulations
would also be helpful in this context.
44. Id. at 562-63.
45. Id. at 564. The right to written notice of the claimed violations was also required in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 489.
46. 418 U.S. at 564. Arguably, twenty-four hours is not long enough since the
inmate may be required to continue his normal working duties and other prison responsibilities for a large part of this period. It should be remembered, however, that the
Court set only a minimum period. State prison authorities are free to give more than
twenty-four hours advance notice if they desire.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., GUmEBOOK, supra note 2, §§ 2-301(12), -302(1).
49. Cf. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
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Disclosureto the Inmate of the Evidence Against Him
Wolff did not explicitly require that the disciplinary defendant
be given a summary of the evidence against him prior to the hearig. Arguably, the Court intended that such a summary be part of
the notice of charges since the notice contemplated by the Court is
"to give the charged party a chance to marshall the facts in his defense and to clarify what the charges are, in fact."50 Notice sufficient to meet this standard would necessarily have to include a summary of the evidence since mere notice of a named violation would
in no way relate the factual basis for the charges or apprise the inmate of the allegations he must rebut in his defense.
The only interest the State could have for denying disclosure
of the evidence against an inmate would be that of insuring the
safety of an anonymous inmate "informer." Disclosure of the inmate accuser's identity either directly or indirectly through too much
detail could result in retaliation against the "squealer." 51 This danger would seem to be present in only a small minority of disciplinary
proceedings since most violations are reported by correctional officials, not fellow inmates. 52 Thus, the right to disclosure of the evidence should be required in all cases except those in which prison
authorities justify its denial in writing.
Opportunity to be Heard in Person and to Present Witnesses and
Documentary Evidence
The opportunity to be heard in person is presumed, 3 and the
right to present witnesses and documentary evidence is explicitly
granted by Wolff with some limitation. 54 In the Court's words, "the
inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional
safety or correctional goals." 55
50. 418 U.S. at 564. The right to disclosure of the evidence against the accused
was also required in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 489.
51. Wolff generally recognized this concern by its reference to "the unwritten code
that exhorts inmates not to inform on a fellow prisoner." 418 U.S. at 562.
52. Id. at 587 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
53. No other conclusion could explain the Court's continued references to "tho
hearing." See, e.g., id. at 561.
54. Id. at 566. The opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses
and documentary evidence was also required in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 489.
55. 418 U.S. at 566.
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The importance of the opportunity to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence cannot be denied. "This gives the accused the
opportunity to corroborate his own version of events, to prove an alibi
defense, and in general to overcome his captors' suspicions as to his
veracity by reason of his substantial interest in the outcome of the
proceedings."5 6 Furthermore, "[t]he right to present the testimony
of impartial witnesses and real evidence . . . is particularly crucial
probto an accused inmate, who obviously faces a severe credibility
57
lem when trying to disprove the charges of a prison guard.
However, just as the importance of the opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence cannot be denied, the state's interests
in denying that opportunity in certain cases can not be ignored.
Wolff recognized two major state interests-institutional safety and
correctional goals-which could justify denial of the opportunity to
58
call witnesses and present evidence.
The threat to prison safety caused by the unrestricted right to
call witnesses is real. For example, witnesses could be used by inmates to subvert the efforts of authorities to maintain order by the
separation of subversive elements. In addition, there may be cases in
which the testimony of a particular witness could reveal, either directly or indirectly, the identity of an anonymous informant and
thereby create a risk of reprisal. In these situations prison officials
must be able to deny the opportunity to call witnesses in order to insure the safety of staff personnel and other inmates within the institution.
Furtherance of correctional goals is more difficult to justify as a
reason for denying the opportunity to call witnesses and to present
evidence. The Court cites the need for the "swift and sure" disciplining of some inmates as a general justification for reduced procedural safeguards in prison disciplinary proceedings.59 This proposition seems totally without merit.60 Allowing an inmate to call a rea56. Herman, Schwartz, Kolleeny, Campana, & Harvey, Due Process in Prison Disciplinary Proceedings: Meyens v. Alldredge, 29 GtUmD PRAc. 79, 87 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Herman].
57. 418 U.S. at 583 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 566.
59. Id. at 563.
60. "Almost all major penologists recognize that an open and fair administrative
process contributes to prisoner rehabilitation and institutional harmony." Hirschkop &
Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REv. 795, 830 (1969).
In addition it is -thought that, "speedy punishment, unless fairly and justly imposed, will
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sonable number of witnesses and present a reasonable amount of documentary evidence will cause only slightly more delay in the imposition of punishment than will result from the required advance notice
of the charges61 and the required hearing. 62 Furthermore, prison
authorities can effectively limit the number of witnesses and amount
of evidence through their power to exclude irrelevant and repetitious
matters.
When terms as broad as institutional safety and correctional
goals are used to define discretion given state officials, the possibility of arbitrary action exists. One means of reducing this possibility
is to require state officials to justify their actions in writing. Wolff
suggested this technique but did not require it.0 3 It should be noted,
however, that the only apparent state interest for not giving written
justifications is one of avoiding the cost and inconvenience that accompany any additional paperwork. Surely this is not a significant
enough interest to outweigh the need to control arbitrary action.
The Right to Confront and Cross-examineAdverse Witnesses
The rights of confrontation and cross-examination have been
held essential in criminal trials6 4 and in other types of cases "where
governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings.""5 Mr. Justice Marshall in his dissent from Wolff argued that
confrontation and cross-examination are as crucial in the prison
discriplinary context as in any other, if not more so. Prison disciplinary proceedings will invariably turn on disputed questions of
fact . . . and, in addition to the usual need for cross-examination

to reveal mistakes of identity, faulty perceptions, or cloudy memories, there is a significant potential for abuse of the disciplinary
process by "persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intoler-

ance, prejudice or jealously," . . . whether these be other in-

their
mates seeking revenge or prison guards seeking to vindicate
otherwise absolute power over the men under their control.00

not only fail to serve as a deterrent to similar conduct but will also counter efforts at
rehabilitation." Herman, supra note 56, at 88.
61. See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
62. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
63. 418 U.S. at 566.
64. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
65. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959); accord, Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
66. 418 U.S. at 585-86.
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Despite these persuasive arguments in favor of allowing confrontation
and cross-examination in prison disciplinary proceedings, the majority in Wolff felt that the state's interests outweighed the inmate's and,
67
thus, they denied these rights in all cases.
In analyzing the policies supporting the denial of confrontation
and cross-examination it is helpful to distinguish between two possible
situations: first, where the accused inmate seeks to confront and crossexamine a previously anonymous inmate informant; secondly, where
the accused inmate seeks to confront and cross-examine a known inmate informant or a prison official who is the accusing party.
In the first situation the majority felt that the "high risk of reprisals" that would result from disclosure of an inmate informer's
identity justified the denial of confrontation and cross-examination. 8
This reasoning is sound because a contrary holding would effectively
end all inmate cooperation in the disciplinary process. However, to
guard against the abuses envisioned by Mr. Justice Marshall 9 it would
be helpful for the disciplinary hearing board to examine the inmate
informant to test his credibility.
The denial of confrontation and cross-examination is less easily
justifiable when the accuser is a prison official or a known inmate
informant. The majority conceded that fewer dangers arise in this
context than in the anonymous inmate informant situation. 0 Yet
they declined to require confrontation and cross-examination, choosing
to "leave these matters to the sound discretion of the officials of state
prisons." 7'
Traditionally, two arguments have been made to support the denial of the right of confrontation and cross-examination of prison
guards.
First, . . . if inmates -are given the right to confront accusers, who
are usually prison guards, then these guards must appear at hearings
instead of performing security functions. This would necessitate
significant diversion of security resources. Second, allowing inmates adversarial rights will erode the traditional inmate-staff relainmates and staff on the same level for a brief
tionship by placing
72
period of time.
Id. at 567-68.
Id. at 568.
See text accompanying note 66 supra.
418 U.S. at 568.
Id. at 569.
72. Millemann, Prison Disciplinary Hearings and Procedural Due Process-The
Requirement of a Full Administrative Hearing,31 MD. L. REv. 27, 45 (1971).
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
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Assuming that hearings could not be held when the services of the
guard were not required, the time the guard spends attending the
hearing must be balanced against the value of confrontation and
cross-examination as methods for discovering truth and determining
credibility. Surely, requiring one guard to leave his duties for a
short time to testify will not significantly reduce security within the
prison. If it does, the state should be required to provide additional
personnel. In any case, the possible inconvenience and additional
costs of requiring confrontation and cross-examination should not out73
weigh the need for ascertaining the truth.
The factual basis of the second argument is unclear. The President's Task Force Report on Corrections found, to the contrary, "that
staff control can be greatest . . . if rules regulating behavior are as

close as possible to those which would be essential for law and order
in any free community .

. .

.

74

"More important is the fact that

authority premised only on power and an avoidance of any outside
scrutiny is not worth preserving, particularly at the expense of a prisoner's right to a legitimate search for truth at the hearing. '76
Wolff seemed to rely primarily on a third "danger" to justify denial of confrontation and cross-examination-"the resentment which
may persist after confrontation. ' 6 However, since the accused inmate already knows who the accusing party is, it seems unlikely that
his resentment would be significantly increased by confrontation. In
fact the possibility of increased resentment that might occur as a result of harsh, vindictive questioning could be controlled either by the
hearing board or by interposing a counsel substitute.77
Upon examinatibn, the denial of confrontation and cross-examination appears justified only in cases in which the accuser is an
anonymous inmate informant. Nevertheless, Wolff has allowed this
rare situation'to set the rule for the more common situation in which
a prison guard presses the charges. As Mr. Justice Marshall states in
his dissent, "[tlhis is surely permitting the tail to wag the constitu73. "It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that fundamental constitutional rights may not be sacrificed in the interest of administrative and fiscal efficiency."
Id. at 44. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-91 n.22 (1972); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1970); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 542 (1965).
74. CoRlEc'roNs, supra note 3, at 50.
75. Wick, Procedural Due Process in Prison Disciplinary Hearings: The Case for
Specific Constitutional Requirements, 18 S.D.L. Rnv. 309, 324 (1973).
76. 418 U.S. at 569.
77. See text accompanying note 97 infra.
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tional dog."178 A more satisfactory solution would be to require confrontation and cross-examination except in cases where the danger to
the witness is overwhelming in the eyes of the hearing board. 79
A "Neutraland Detached"HearingBody
Wolff held that the Nebraska hearing board, which was made
up exclusively of prison officials, was sufficiently impartial to satisfy
due process requirements.8 0 This finding is clearly limited to the
facts of Wolff and, thus, does not set the standard for all hearing
boards. 8 ' However, since due process does require an impartial hearing 2 and since this "is a particularly difficult requirement to satisfy
within the confines of a closed institution,"8 the problems of allowing
prison officials to judge the conduct of inmates must be examined.
In a small, closed institution . . . staff members are familiar
with many of the inmates and usually bring to the Board hearings
a great deal of personal knowledge about a particular inmate and
sometimes bias, either favorable or unfavorable, toward him. The
result often is that the disciplinary decision is made on the basis of
-the personal and usually unarticulated feelings of a staff member,
rather than on the facts presented at the hearing.
Board members may not act impartially because they feel that
their duty is to support the staff in all cases. As one Board member
put it, "[t]he philosophy in the past has been always back up your
officers, whether they are right or wrong." Such a view is particularly harmful to the integrity of the disciplinary process, when, as
in most contested hearings, the evidence consists mainly of conflicting testimony by the pnsoner and a staff member.
Another factor which may affect the disposition of the case
is the inmate's behavior before the Board. An inmate who is
"defiant" or had a "hard attitude" or insists
on his "rights" is un84
likely to win the sympathy of the Board.
These factors substantiate the view that prison staff personnel
cannot be impartial when judging inmates. However, upon exami78. 418 U.S. at 587.
79. A requirement that denials be justified in writing would prevent this exception
from swallowing the rule and would reduce the "great litigation and attendant costs,"
feared by the majority. Id. at 569.
80. 418 U.S. at 570-71. A "neutral and detached" hearing body was also required
in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 489.
81. See 418 U.S. at 570-71.
82. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970).
83. Wick, supra note 75, at 323-24.
84. Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, fudicial Intervention in PrisonDiscipline,
63 J.C iM. L. &C. 200, 210 (1972).
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nation, the only viable alternative-bringing in "outsiders" to sit on
hearing boards 85 -is even less desirable. "Outsiders" should not be
paid since if the state pays them they could become as entrenched in
the system as other staff personnel. Persons who would volunteer to
serve would likely be those community citizens with the most interest
in and concern about the correctional system. They could be as biased in favor of prisoners as the hearing board might be against
them. True, these "outsiders" would probably not have personal
knowledge about individual inmates but neither would they have the
personal knowledge of prison life that is valuable in judging credibility.
Most importantly, if "outsiders" were allowed to impose disciplinary sanctions on inmates there would be a separation of authority from responsibility, which would reduce morale among the prison
staff and which might encourage arbitrary action. If prison guards
felt a group of "outsiders" who didn't understand prison life would be
scrutinizing their every move, they might be inclined to avoid the disciplinary process altogether "either by disciplining the inmates informally or by ignoring infractions of the prison rules. '80
The best solution may be to leave both the authority and the responsibility for prison discipline with prison officials. At the same
time, the possibilities for bias could be reduced by preventing those
persons from serving on the board who have participated in the investigation of the case, are witnesses, are charged with subsequent
review, have personal knowledge of a material fact, have prior involvement with the accused, or have a personal interest in the out87
come.
A Written Statement by the Factfinders of the Evidence Relied on and
Reasons for the Disciplinary Action Taken
Wolff held that there must be a written statement of the the evidence relied on and reasons for the action taken. 8 This requirement
85. Wick, supra note 75, at 324.
86. Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, supra note 84, at 209.
87. Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1084 (M.D. Fla. 1973). This
standard could be met by bringing in staff from other parts of the prison complex who
have duties which would not put them in as close contact with the prisoners as guards.
Such a group might include administrators and counselors.
88. 418 U:S. at 564. A written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence
relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action taken was also required in Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 489.
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insures that inmates will be protected "against collateral consequences based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the original
proceeding." 8 9 In addition, a written record of the proceedings gives
inmates the reasons for their winning or losing and, thus, instills
confidence in the system. 90 The Court recognized that there may be
a need to exclude certain items of evidence in some cases91 but, in
general, it perceived "no conceivable rehabilitative objective or prospect
of prison disruption that can flow from the requirement of these statements." 92
Right to Counsel or Counsel Substitute
The Court in Wolff denied the right -to retained or appointed
counsel in prison disciplinary proceedings. 93 In denying this right,
the Court relied on the effect counsel would have on the nature of
the proceedings and on the practical problems of delay and increased costs. 94 The insertion of counsel was viewed as giving "the
proceedings a more adversary cast .

.

. ,,. This surely would be

the result since counsel are "bound by professional duty to present all
available evidence and arguments in support of their clients' positions
and to contest with vigor all adverse evidence and views."9
However, the Court failed to answer the question of whether an
adversary hearing is necessarily evil. Surely such a hearing would
insure a fairer presentation of the facts and would enhance the search
for truth. In addition, the interposition of counsel would reduce the
resentment the Court feared would result from allowing confrontation. 97 On the other hand, adversary proceedings could reduce the
ability of disciplinary boards to accomplish correctional goals. The
hearing would become a win or lose situation with little room for rehabilitative compromise. Furthermore, the problems of morale and
the tendency to avoid the disciplinary process which were discussed
in relation to the use of "outsiders" on hearing boards would again
be raised if outside counsel were allowed.9"
89. 418 U.S. at 565.
90. See Wick, supra note 75, at 325.
91. 418 U.S. at 565.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 570. The right to counsel or counsel substitute was required in Gagnon
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
94. 418 U.S. at 569-70, quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-88 (1973).
95. 418 U.S. at 570.
96. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973).
97. See text accompanying notes 76-77 supra.
98. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
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The arguments both for and against counsel are persuasive when
the effect on the nature of the proceeding is all that is considered.
However, the practical concerns of delay and increased cost tip the
scale in favor of the denial of retained or appointed counsel. More
questions will be asked, objections made, and rulings required when
counsel is present. As a result the record will become more detailed
and, thus, require additional time to prepare. Increased cost will ensue from the use of appointed counsel for indigent inmates and counsel for the state.99 In addition, the lengthened disciplinary process
will require additional personnel and facilities for its operation.
Having denied retained and appointed counsel to the disciplinaryaction defendant, the Court held that substitute aid from either staff
personnel or other inmates must be provided "[w]here an illiterate inmate is involved or where the complexity of the issue makes it
unlikely that the inmate will be able to collect and present the evidence necessary for an adequate comprehension of the case ....010
The use of staff personnel as counsel substitutes presents problems.
Staff members are put in the position of representing inmates against
fellow staff members. If they become strong advocates for inmates
they may be criticized by their fellow workers and if they don't they
may not be effective aid to the inmates.101
The alternative of allowing inmates to act as substitute counsel
is no better. Inmate represenatives may use the hearing as an opportunity to express their own feelings and frustrations. Such activity
would reduce the effectiveness of the aid and could damage the accused's case. In addition, there is the danger that a few inmates
may be able to control who can get help and how much those who
get it must pay for it. In spite of the problems that may arise in
a substitute aid plan, and particularly in view of the inmates' need for
assistance, counsel substitutes appear to be the best available solution.
CONCLUSION

The promise of due process given by Wolff is a welcomed step
toward the protection of prisoners' fights. However, "[i]t is an empty
promise to guarantee fairness while omitting the tools necessary to accomplish that fairness.
99.
100.
101.
102.

'02

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973).
418 U.S. at 570.
Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, supra note 84, at 208.
Millemann, supra note 72, at 50.
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The Court's provisions for notice of the charges, opportunity to
call witnesses and to present real evidence, and a written record of the
evidence relied on and reasons for the action taken' 0 ' are crucial to
a fair hearing and their importance must not be ignored. The effectiveness of these procedures for insuring fairness, however, is diminished by the denial of confrontation and cross-examination.
First, although notice is required in part to "enable [the inmate]
to marshal the facts and prepare a defense,""', "[a]bsent confrontation and cross-examination, . . . the party proceeded against is without knowledge of the adverse evidence and cannot, therefore . . .
make his defense."' 1 5 Furthermore, without the chance to "challenge
the word of his accusers" 10 6 given by the rights of confrontation and
cross-examination, it will be considerably more difficult for the prisoner to "'explain away the accusation' ,'07 since he cannot show
mistake by the other party. Finally, even the most impartial hearing
board cannot fairly judge credibility, nor accurately determine which
version of the disputed facts is true if one side in the contest is not
even questioned. 0 8
THOMAS WARREN

Ross

Labor Law-Organizational Rights of Managerial Employees
In 1970 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) abruptly departed from the position it had maintained throughout its history on the
status of managerial employees under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).' Traditionally, the Board had excluded from bargaining
units and from coverage by the Act, all employees whom it identified
as managerial, 2 even though these employees were never statutorily ex103.
104.
105.
106.

418 U.S. at 581 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 564.
Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1087 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
418 U.S. at 582 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

107. Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1086 (M.D. Fla. 1973), quoting Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1935).
108. 418 U.S. at 582.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1970).
2. For a history of the status of managerial employees see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 275-90 (1974).
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eluded by the NLRA.3 For purposes of this exclusion, the Board
labelled as "managerial" any employee who participated in the formulation, determination or effectuation of management policies. 4 In 1970,
however, the Board repudiated its former position and in effect
established a presumption that managerial employees were entitled to
bargaining rights under the NLRA unless it could be shown that they
were involved in shaping or implementing labor relations policies for
their employers.5 This new position was shortlived. In NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co. Division of Textron, Inc.6 the United States Supreme
Court reinstated the Board's former rule, holding that all employees
properly classified as managerial are excluded from the protections of
the NLRA-not just those in positions susceptible to conflicts of interest in labor relations."
On June 16, 1971, the buyers in the purchasing and procurement
department of a plant operated by Bell Aerospace Company voted in
favor of union representation. Prior to the election the company had
objected to the designation of the buyers as an appropriate bargaining
unit on the grounds that they were managerial employees and thus excluded from the collective bargaining provisions of the Act. 8 The
3. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970). The Board accomplished this statutory modification through the exercise of the discretionary power to determine appropriate bargaining
units which was vested in it by section 9(b) of the Act. Section 9(b) reads in part
as follows: "The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant
unit, or subdivision thereof. . .

"

29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970).

Managerial employees were not the only class of employees to be denied collective
bargaining rights under this section. Confidential employees, defined in Ford Motor
Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946) as "those employees who assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons who exercise 'managerial' functions in the field of labor relations," have also been refused the protection and privileges granted to other workers by
the NLRA. Both classes of employees were excluded from the Act to the same extent
as were the statutorily excluded employees--"all are outside the Act for purposes of the
employee rights accorded by section 7 (including bargaining unit representation) and
denied protection from what otherwise would be unfair labor practices under section 8,
despite the lack of reference to either classification in the language of the NLRA." 26
VANe. L. REV. 850, 853-54 (1973).
4. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946).
5. See North Ark. Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 550 (1970).
6. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
7. A second issue resolved in Bell Aerospace, which will not be discussed in this
note, was whether, in order to decide if a certain class of employees, in this case buyers,
were properly classified as managerial, the Board was obligated to employ its section
6 rulemaking powers or whether it could make this determination in an adjudicatory proceeding. The Court held that not only is resolution of this type of problem in an adjudicatory proceeding permitted, but that adjudication is a particularly appropriate
method of making that determination. Id. at 294.
8. Id. at 269. The company argued alternatively that, since the buyers could ne-
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Board, however, held that only those managerial employees who are
involved in formulating and effectuating their employer's labor policies
are excluded from the Act and certified the union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the buyers.9 The company refused to bargain
after the election and the Board, upon finding that the company had
violated sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of the Act, issued an order requiring the company to bargain.' 0 The Second Circuit denied enforce-

ment of the order" and the case was brought to the Supreme Court on
appeal by the Board. A sharply divided Supreme Court held that all

managerial employees must be excluded from the coverage of the Act
and that the Board was not free to restrict that traditional exclusion to

only those employees whose union activity might present a conflict of
12
interest in labor relations.
To reach this decision without any explicit statutory basis, the
majority relied first upon the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley
Act. 13 To the Court, this history indicated that Congress had intended

to exclude managerial employees from the NLRA even though no express provision to that effect was included in the Taft-Hartley Act.

Congress apparently believed that explicit exclusion was unnecessary
since the Board's policy at that time was to exclude such employees and
there was no reason to expect this policy to change in the future.' 4 The
gotiate prices, select vendors, and commit the company's credit up to $5000, representation should be denied because of the potential for conflict of interest. The Board rejected this claim, noting that the buyers' discretion was limited by guidelines established
by the employer and thus any temptation to use their position to assist the union movement could be effectively curtailed. Id. at 271.
9. See Bell Aerospace Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 431 (1971), reaff'd, 196 N.L.R.B. 827
(1972).
10. 197 N.L.R.B. 209 (1972).
11. 475 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973).
12. 416 U.S. at 289.
13. Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
14. To substantiate this position the Court pointed to the Conference Committee
Report that specifically stated that provisions of a House bill calling for explicit exclusion from the Act of employees working in labor relations, employment and personnel
departments had been deleted from the final version of the bill because Congress believed that the Board would continue its de facto exclusion of these employees without
specific legislation. Id. at 282. The majority also pointed to excerpts from the legislative history of the Act that indicated congressional concern that bargaining rights should
not be extended to corporate executives.
In discussing the status of confidential employees, the House noted that "[m]ost
of the people who would qualify as 'confidential employees' are executives and are excluded from the Act in any event." H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23
(1947). Finally, the majority relied on language in the Senate Report and on comments
made during congressional debates that indicated congressional concern that, if supervisory employees were granted bargaining rights under the Act, the same reasoning could
be used to extend these rights to "corporate vice-presidents and other executives who
were part of management." 416 U.S. at 284 n.13.
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Court also noted that, in passing the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress was
concerned with the welfare of the common worker and not with those
representing the employer's interests. Accordingly, Congress sought
to maintain a distinct division between management and labor to assure
that employers would have loyal representatives within the company
and that "bosses" would not be allowed in positions that would enable
them to dominate or cause them to be dominated by the rank-and-file
workers."5 From rather sketchy passages in the legislative history of
the Taft-Hartley Act the majority reasoned that, since Congress may
have intended to exclude certain managerial employees, all other employees traditionally classified as managerial should likewise be considered as outside of the Act even though they were never mentioned
in the congressional debates or reports. The majority also relied
heavily upon congressional failure to enact legislation either in 194710
or 19591" explicitly including managerial employees within the scope
of the Act in light of the Board's prior holdings that they were
18
excluded.
The dissent, on the other hand, agreed with the Board's new position that only those managerial employees who shape and implement
the employer's labor policies should be denied the right to organize under the NLRA. They argued that only the organization of this narrower group of workers would upset the delicate balance of power in
the collective bargaining process that Congress had intended to main19
tain.
Although the Supreme Court majority in Bell Aerospace presented a feasible argument that Congress in 1947 contemplated the ex15. 416 U.S. at 281-82.
16. The NLRA was amended in 1947 by the Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat.
136 (1947).
17. The NLRA was further amended in 1959 by the Landrum-Griffin Act, Pub.
L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
18. After reviewing the Board's decisions in this area, the Court concluded that,
although prior to 1947 the Board had never stated that managerial employees could not
be accorded bargaining rights under the Act, it had nonetheless never permitted them
to be included in bargaining units of rank-and-file workers and had never certified a bargaining unit comprised exclusively of managerial employees. 416 U.S. at 276. The
Court also noted that after 1947 the Board did expressly adopt the position that managerial employees were beyond the scope of the Act and consistently maintained this position until 1970. Id. at 289. The majority then argued that congressional failure to
modify the Board's holding or to change the Board's definition of "managerial employee"
was persuasive evidence that that agency's interpretation of the statute was the one intended by Congress. id. at 275.
19. Id. at 308. The dissent based its decision on the lack of any specific language
in either the statute or the legislative history of the Act addressed to the status of managerial employees. Id. at 297.
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clusion of managerial employees as well as supervisory employees from
the Act, the dissent presented an equally persuasive argument that
Congress did not intend such a broad exclusion. Confronted with such
ambiguity, perhaps a better approach to the issue would have been to
examine it in light of the policies that underlie the NLRA and the economic realities of current industrial organization.
The congressional concerns outlined in the majority's decision
were based on industrial organization as it existed in 1947. Employment patterns, however, have changed drastically since that time with
a larger percentage of workers now entering the lower levels of management. 20 As the number of these managerial employees has increased, so may have the bureaucratization and concomitant disaffection with higher management that usually accompanies such an increase. As a result, the traditional alignment with the employer that
the Board had in the past attributed to managerial employees2 1 may
have been severed. If these employees have lost or subsequently lose
their attachments to their employers and find that their demands are
not being satisfied, they may, despite the Supreme Court's ruling in Bell
Aerospace, organize and bargain outside of the Act. Their constitutional right to do so has been established. 2 The result might be the
type of economic warfare that the Act was designed to avoid. 3
20. Statistics presented in the United States Bureau of the Census Reports show
for example that, while only 0.09% of the labor force were classified as personnel and
labor relations workers in 1950, 0.15% were so classified in 1960 and 0.38% in 1970.
Likewise, in 1950 only 0.059% of the labor force were classified as credit personnel

whereas the 1960 figure was 0.070% and the 1970 figure was 0.080%.

This trend is

also reflected in the percentages of workers employed as purchasing agents and buyers

(other than retail buyers): 0.11% in 1950; 0.15% in 1960; and 0.21% in 1970. See
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1970, SUBJECT REPORTS,
OCCUPATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS (Final Rep. 1973); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
OF POPULATION: 1960, SUBJECT REPORTS, OCCUPATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS,
table 1, at 2-3 (Final Rep. 1963); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATIoN: 1950, EMPLOYMENT AND PERSONAL CHARACTERIsTiCs, table 1, at 1B 15-16,
CENSUS

(Spec. Reports, pt. 1, ch. A, 1953).
21.

Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 366 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Sunnyland

Packing Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 162 (1955); Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75
N.L.R.B. 320 (1947).
22. See Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548,
570 (1930); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911). Although the collective bargaining provisions and unfair labor practice protections of the

Act lend enormous strength to a union movement, they are not always essential.
23. Section 1 of the Act expresses its policy:
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and
the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining
lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the

intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce.

...

Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees
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Neither the Board nor the Court could then regulate this activity since
the regulatory mechanisms of the Act are not applicable to employees
not covered by it. The result could be detrimental to the interests of
both employers and employees.
The Supreme Court's decision to exclude all managerial employees from the collective bargaining process provided by the Act also ignores the fact that, although these employees may be more closely
aligned to management than to rank-and-file workers with respect to
their job responsibilities, they share with all other employees the desire
for job security, periodic wage increases, and other economic benefits
that the employer might not provide absent organized economic pressure. Although in the past managerial employees could probably expect to achieve such benefits by performing their jobs well, a substantial
increase in the number of managerial employees might have reduced
the possibility that outstanding work will be noticed and rewarded.
While there are legitimate policies favoring unions of managerial
employees, there are also legitimate objections. The Board has long
recognized that the most serious of these objections is the potential conflict of interest 24 that might destroy the delicate balance of power between labor and management that the Act seeks to assure. Examples
of the potential dangers to employers claimed to be inherent in such
a split of allegiance include the possibilities: (1) that managerial employees who are unionized might show favoritism to union-organized
companies when accepting bids or making purchases; (2) that the employees will guard the interests of their sister unions in the company
when making recommendations of management policies or when
executing these policies; and (3) that managerial employees may further disrupt the conduct of their employer's business by engaging in
sympathy strikes or other economic measures to assist sister unions in
their bargaining struggle with the employer in exchange for similar asto organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest ....
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . . by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting
the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid and
protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
24. The conflict is between the employee as a union member and the employee as
a representative of management.
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sistance when the managerial employees bargain.

Such concerns, however, are perhaps unfounded since the employer has the capacity to control possible inclinations toward favoritism

by discharging employees if their unprotected activities cause injury to
the business and by establishing strict guidelines to which these employ-

ees must conform when making managerial decisions. However, the
employer may argue in response that after-the-fact discharge does not
remedy a fait accompli breach of trust and that in certain instances,

broad discretion is precisely what is required of an employee's position.
Thus forcing the employee to adhere to strict guidelines would partially

destroy his usefulness to the employer.
As a result of Bell Aerospace the types of employees to whom
the Act's protections will not be available will be determined by the
criteria established by the Board for defining managerial employees
prior to 1970. Corporate officers and employees who work in labor
relations 25 have always been held to be managerial as have employees
who have actual responsibility for hiring or firing or who may effectively
recommend such action.20 Other employees have been found to be
managerial if the evidence showed that they participated in making or
implementing the employer's management policies 27 or had "discretion,

independent of the employer's established policy, in the performance
of [their] duties.

28

Using this formula, the Board has fairly consist-

ently labelled the following positions managerial: buyers,2 9 credit de25. See American Broadcasting Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 74, 79 (1953) (employee whose
responsibilities included formulating the employer's interpretation of collective bargaining contract clauses held managerial).
26. Bonwit Teller, Inc., 84 N.L.R.B. 414, 422 (1949).
27. To be classified as an employee who formulates or implements the employer's
management policies, the employee must be in a position to make decisions that will
definitely influence that policy. The fact that he may recommend policy decisions does
not alone establish his managerial status. Nor does "mere participation in conferences
of supervisory personnel, from which emerge some decisions, based in part upon his recommendations . . . ." Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 97 N.L.R.B. 1271, 1272 (1952). See
Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 37, 41 (7th Cir. 1969); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 122 N.L.R.B. 391, 392-93 (1958); Puget Sound Power & Light Co.,
117 N.L.R.B. 1825, 1827 (1957). See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 337,
340 (1955).
28. Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 37, 41 (7th Cir. 1969);
Eastern Camera & Photo Corp., 140 N.L.R.B. 569 (1963). "TIThe Board does not consider the performance of duties requiring the exercise of judgment to be an indication
of managerial status per se, nor do the lack of close supervision and freedom to exercise
considerable discretion render an employee managerial where his decisions must conform
to the employer's established policy." Albert Lea Cooperative Creamery Ass'n, 119
N.L.R.B. 817, 822-23 (1957); see American Broadcasting C., 107 N.L.R.B. 74, 79
(1953); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 549, 554-55 (1948).
29. Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752, 753 (1956); see Curtiss-Wright Corp., 103
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partment personnel, 30 expediters,"' and employees who establish the
company's price lists.3 2

Had the Board's new test been affirmed by the court, labor relations personnel would of course have been excluded.

The dissent also

suggested that, if corporate officers were not reached because of their
responsibilities for labor relations, they could probably be excluded as
supervisory. 3 In addition, although neither the Board nor the dissent
in Bell Aerospace defined the scope of the category "employees who

shape or implement the employer's labor relations policies," it is likely
that such a category would include upper-level employees in the employment and personnel departments. Thus the principal categories of
employees who would be excluded from the Act under the majority's
test but included under the Board's test are buyers, some credit department personnel, expediters, and employees who set prices for goods

manufactured by the company.
Having established whose right to organize under the Act is
actually at issue, one may then determine whether the Supreme Court
or the Labor Board adopted the better position. To make this determination it is necessary to balance the employer's right to have loyal
employees to assist him in making and executing his management
policies against the strong public policy of promoting peaceful settlements of labor disputes and the employees' interest in achieving a bargaining position sufficient to insure their effective participation in their
economic future. Would permitting these employees to organize in
N.L.R.B. 458, 464 (1953); Electric Controller & Mfg. Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 1242, 1246
(1946); Barrett Div., Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 65 N.L.R.B. 903, 905 (1946); Hudson
Motor Car Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 509, 512 (1944). The Board has also excluded as managerial a buyer who, though limited to placing orders with an approved list of vendors,
could use his discretion as to which vendor would receive the order. Titeflex, Inc., 103
N.L.R.B. 223, 225-26 (1953).
30. Charles Livingston & Sons, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 30, 33-34 (1949). Contra,
Franklin's Stores Corp., 117 N.L.R.B. 793, 794-95 (1957). If the amount of credit and
the standards for extending credit are so limited as to make the determinations routine,
the employee will not be held to be managerial. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 100 N.L.R.B.
90, 91 (1952).
31. Spicer Mfg. Corp., 55 N.L.R.B. 1491, 1498 (1944). But see Barrett Div., Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 65 N.L.R.B. 903, 907 (1946).
32. Electric Controller & Mfg. Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 1242, 1245 (1946) . The Board
has refused to recognized similar positions as managerial. American Fed. of Labor, 120
N.L.R.B. 969 (1958) (employees with remote connection with top management); Titeflex, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 223, 224 (1953) (sales representatives); Transit Cas. Co., 83
N.L.R.B. 857, 859 (1949) (insurance adjusters); Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 75
N.L.R.B. 1132, 1126 (1948) (sales representatives).
33. 416 U.S. at 307 n.3.
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bargaining units separate from those of the rank-and-file workers 34 so

hinder the employer in operating his business and place him at such
disadvantage at the bargaining table that the employees should be de-

nied the right to organize by judicial decree even though the NLRA
has never explicitly denied them that right? The answer to this question is at best a matter of opinion. However, it was precisely for decid-

ing this type of question that Congress established a special agency that,
through its constant contact with industry and the problems of interpreting the labor statutes, could develop the expertise needed to resolve
these issues. 35 Nevertheless, the Board's response has been rejected
and the responsibility for providing these employees the protection of
the NLRA lies now with Congress.
SHIRLEY J.WELLS

Public Utilities-State Action and Informal Due Process After
Jackson
For nearly a century those who would impose constitutional limita-

tions on ostensibly private conduct have been grappling with the elusive
concept of "state action."' Indeed, the problem of defining state action in the troublesome no man's land between purely private and

purely governmental conduct has been called the most important problem in American law.2 In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.3 -the
United States Supreme Court found the essential state -action requirement lacking in a customer's attempt to impose due process limitations

on the termination procedure of a privately owned utility company.4
34. Separate units for guards and professional employees have been authorized
since 1947. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970).
35. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944).
1. In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) the United States Supreme
Court first propounded the essential dichotomy between state action, which is subject
to constitutional restraints, and "individual invasion of individual rights," which is not.
The distinction for fourteenth amendment purposes is based on the proscription that
"[n]o State shall make or enforce any law. . . ." U.S. CoNST.amend. XIV, § 1.
2. See Black, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection,and California'sProposition 14, 81 HAIv. L. REv. 69 (1967).
3. 95 S.Ct. 449 (1974).
4. Lower courts had been sharply divided in applying the state action doctrine to
utilities which were privately owned, but subject to extensive and detailed regulation by
the state. Compare Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973); Ihrke
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Having resolved this threshold question in favor of the utility, the Court
did not reach further issues pertaining to the nature of the property
right involved, or what due process would require if there were state
action for fourteenth amendment purposes.5
In October 1971 Metropolitan Edison, the sole supplier of electricity to much of the York, Pennsylvania, area, terminated its service
to Catherine Jackson for alleged non-payment of bills.0 Mrs. Jackson
disputed that her utility account was in arrears, contending that she
never received a bill for the period of the alleged delinquency.

Upon

the discontinuance of her electrical service without prior notice, she
filed suit under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act7 seeking reinstatement of her utility service until she had been afforded notice, a hearing,
and an opportunity to pay any amounts found due. She claimed a
statutory right to reasonably continuous electrical service, 8 alleging that
Metropolitan's termination of her service constituted state action depriving her of property without due process of law.
In seeking to establish the requisite state action, the petitioner re-

lied upon three major arguments: (1) Metropolitan's actions could
have been attributed to the State because of the State's grant of monop-

oly status to the company;' (2) the state action stemmed from the
v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815
(1972); Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), with
Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972) and Kadlec V. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 407 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1969).
5. 95 S. Ct. at 452 n.2.
6. Metropolitan operates pursuant to extensive regulations filed with the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission and is the holder of a "certificate of public convenience" from the Commission. The issuance of such a certificate is a prerequisite for engaging in the utility business in Pennsylvania. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1121
(1959). Under its regulations filed with the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission,
Metropolitan Edison is permitted to discontinue service for nonpayment of bills, upon
reasonable notice to the delinquent customer. See 95 S. Ct. at 451.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides for a civil action for "deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and the laws." The person
causing this deprivation must be acting "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State .

. . ."

This language has been equated by the Su-

preme Court for all practical purposes with the state action standard of the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1171 (1959) provides in part: "Every public utility
shall furnish and maintain adequate, efficient, safe and reasonable service and facilities
... . Such service also shall be reasonably continuous and without unreasonable interruptions or delay."
9. The theoretical basis for this argument is that the state, by its acquiescence
in, if not direct conferral of, monopoly power upon a public utility, greatly increases
the efficacy of the utility's termination procedures. The customer knows that the utility
threatening to terminate his service is his only possible source of electrical power. Likewise, the utility has little incentive as a monopolist to cultivate the good will of custo-
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essential nature of the service rendered, giving it the character of a
"public function"; 10 (3) the service termination was state action because Metropolitan's regulations dealing with termination procedures
were filed with, and approved by, the state regulatory agency. 1
The six-member majority found none of these contentions persuasive. Analyzing each argument separately,' 2 the Court held that there
was an insufficient relationship between the alleged grant of monopoly
status 13 and the challenged termination to justify labeling that termination "state action." Taking the narrow view that a "public function"
must be an obligation imposed upon the state by statute,' 4 the majority
rejected the petitioner's second argument on the ground that the Pennsylvania statute imposed an obligation to furnish service only on the
mers by eschewing high-handed termination procedures. See Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REv.
656, 671 (1974); Note, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process in Terminations of Utility
Service for Nonpayment, 86 HAgv. L. REv. 1477, 1487 (1973); cf. Moose Lodge No.
107 v.Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972); Lavoie v.Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7, 14-15 (1st Cir.
1972).
10. Private activity has been deemed state action when it involves itself in the
public domain to the extent that it can be considered "quasi-municipal" in nature, thus
giving the public an overriding interest in its regulation. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.
296, 301-02 (1966) (privately owned park); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)
(company town); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TExAs L. REv. 347, 378
(1963). Compare Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), with Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
11. See note 6 supra.
12. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion, pointed to the necessity of analyzing
all the relevant factors in their aggregate in a state action determination, rather than
approaching the problem with the idea of finding any single factor that will suffice to
establish state action. See 95 S. CL at 458; Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
13. The majority assumed arguendo that such a monopoly status had infact been
conferred by the State. At the same time, itwas emphasized that Metropolitan's regulations did not actually contain an outright grant or guarantee of monopoly status, but
rather that the utility business isa natural monopoly, caused by the industry's high fixed
costs and significant economies of scale. See 95 S.Ct. at 454 n.8. The significance
accorded this fact seems to be that even without regulation by the State, Metropolitan
would have been a "natural" monopolist anyway and that therefore a causal relationship
between the State's involvement and Metropolitan's monopolistic behavior was lacking.
This approach overlooks the fact that the State, by regulating rates, removed any possible incentive to competitors who wished to enter the market despite the high initial investment, in hope of obtaining high profit margins. See id. at 461-62 (Marshall, J.,dissenting). More importantly, it overlooks the State's removal of legal barriers to Metropolitan's monopoly status. See Note, 86 HARV. L. REv., supra note 9, at 1489. Ironically, utilities have succeeded in removing themselves from the prohibitions of the federal
antitrust laws on the ground that they perform state action. See Gas Light Co. v.
Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1138-40 (5th Cir. 1971).
14. See 95 S.Ct. at 454. "If we were dealing with the exercise by Metropolitan
of some power delegated to itby the State which is traditionally associated with sovereignty.., our case would be quite a different one." Id.
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licensed utility, not on the state. 15 Finally, the majority adopted a

standard of unprecedented rigidity in disposing of the petitioner's third
contention. State approval of Metropolitan's termination procedure
"where the Commission has not put its own weight on the side of the
proposed practice by ordering it"' 6 did not place the stamp of state ac-

tion on a practice initiated by the private utility, where the role of the
State was initially passive. What the majority innocuously perceived
was a "heavily regulated private utility, enjoying at least a partial monopoly in the providing of electrical service within its territory.

.

.that

. . .elected to terminate service to petitioner in a manner which the
Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission found permissible under state
law.'

7

Much of the case law and literature on the subject of state action
has applied that doctrine to cases in which the challenged activity involved racial discrimination.18 More recently, however, individuals
have been seeking constitutional vindication of an expansive array of
offended "rights" under the rubric of state action. 19 Decisions have
tended to define three broad categories in which the indicia of government involvement in private activity have been sufficient to sustain a
finding of "state action. 2 0 These are judicial enforcement of the challenged activity, 2 1 "joint participation" by a governmental agency in that
15. That the utility, and not the State, is required by statute to provide electrical
services in no way detracts from the essentially public nature of the service. The State
made a conscious decision to permit private companies, under a regulatory regime imposed by the State, to provide utility services. It seems clear that the alternative,
adopted in municipalities across the nation, is for state or local governments to provide
those essential services themselves. See 95 S. Ct. at 464 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 1963
MOODY'S PUBLIC UTILITY MANUAL a86.
16. 95 S.Ct. at 456-57 (emphasis added).
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Evans v. Abney,
396 U.S. 435 (1970); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947); Williams, supra note 10.
19. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (first amendment
challenge against advertising policy of broadcast licensee); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551 (1972); Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968) (first amendment challenges against solicitation rules of private
shopping centers); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973)
(challenge to law school examination procedure); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.
1968) (challenge to private school disciplinary proceedings); cases cited note 4 supra.
20. See generally Note, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REv. 840
(1974).
21. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947) (judicial enforcement of a racially
restrictive covenant held to constitute "state action"). But cf. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S.
435 (1970).
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activity,2" and cases in which the state involvement stems from -the essentially public nature of the entity performing the challenged activity.2 These latter two categories are most pertinent to the public utility case presently under consideration.
In the leading case of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority2"
the United States Supreme Court held that a privately owned restaurant practicing racial discrimination had a sufficiently close relationship
to the State of Delaware to characterize that discrimination as "state
action." The building in which the restaurant was located was owned
by a state agency and public funds were expended for its maintenance.
Most significantly, a state-owned parking garage in the same building
benefited from the presence of the restaurant, and the restaurant benefited from the presence of adjacent parking facilities. The Court held
that "[t]he State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with Eagle [the restaurant] that it must be recognized as
a joint participant in the challenged activity . .
,25
In Public Utilities Commission v. Pollack2 6 passengers on a privately owned, but publicly regulated, bus sytem in Washington, D.C.
alleged that the federal government violated plaintiffs' first and fifth
amendment rights by forcing them to listen to piped-in radio programs
while riding the system's buses. The Supreme Court found "state action" present not because of the overall regulatory scheme, but because
in this case the Public Utilities Commission had initiated an investigation into the radio programs and had affirmatively sanctioned them on
27
public interest grounds.
28
In the recent case of CBS v. Democratic National Committee
-theCourt was again faced with a pervasive regulatory regime, instituted
by the government as licensor of the public airwaves. CBS, the licensee, followed a policy of not accepting editorial advertising. Despite
22. Compare Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7 (lst
Cir. 1972); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968), with CBS v. Democratic Nat'l

Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) and
Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973).
23. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946). Compare Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), vith Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
24. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
25. Id. at 725.
26. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).

27. See id. at 462.
28. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
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the existence of sweeping governmental regulation, the Court declined
to find state action present in the CBS advertising policy, since the relationship of mutual benefit found to be significant in Burton was missing, as was the specific endorsement of the licensee's practice that
formed the basis of the Pollack decision. 0
A fourth "joint participant" case deserving of mention is Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis. 0 Moose Lodge involved a claim that the issuance of a liquor license 3' to a racially discriminatory private club by
the State of Pennsylvania constituted a denial of equal protection to
a black person who had been refused service. The Supreme Court
stated that "where the impetus for the discrimination is private, the
State must have 'significantly involved itself with invidious discriminations' ,32 to warrant a finding of state action. Noting that the state had
not approved, encouraged, or initiated the discrimination, the Court
held that it was insufficiently connected with the specific activity complained of. Again, the elements of the "symbiotic relationship" that
characterized Burton were found lacking.33
Moose Lodge recognized the relevance of the state-imposed monopoly as a relevant factor in a state action determination, noting that
Pennsylvania limited the number of liquor licenses that it would issue.
Significantly, the Moose Lodge's monopoly was found to be only of limited effect-hence insufficient to qualify the State as a "joint partici3
pant." 1
The second set of state action cases relevant to the public utility
problem are characterized as the "public function" cases. In Marsh
v. Alabama 5 an individual was arrested under a trespass ordinance,
on the streets of a company town, for passing out religious literature
against the wishes of the company's management. Notwithstanding
the private ownership of the town, the United States Supreme Court
found "state action" in contravention of the first amendment, stating,
"the more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use
29. Moreover, the first amendment protection enjoyed by CBS made the Court hesitant to set a precedent that could lead to the imposition of a broad range of constitutional obligations on broadcast licensees. See id. at 120-21; text accompanying notes 5254 infra.
30. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
31. The state imposed a ceiling on the total number of licenses that would be issued, along with detailed regulations governing the acquisition of a license.
32. 407 U.S. at 173, quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967).
33. Id. at 175.
34. See id. at 177; Note, 74 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 9, at 670.
35. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed
by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it."3 6
The rationale of Marsh was extended in Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. 3 Logan Valley involved
an attempt by the owners of a shopping center to prohibit peaceful
picketing of a business enterprise because it constituted an unconsented to invasion of property rights. Equating a shopping center to
the company town's business district encountered in Marsh, the Supreme Court held that the State's trespass laws could not be used to
exclude those wishing to exercise first amendment rights from property
open -to the public. The decision was carefully limited, however, to
instances in which those rights were being exercised "in a manner and
for a purpose generally consonant with the use to which the property
is actually put."3': 8 As in Marsh, a factor weighing heavily with the
Court was the important nature of the constitutional right being restricted, as compared to the apparent lack of any serious deprivation
of privacy or property interests vested in the shopping center's owners.

39

The "balancing of interests" approach suggested in Marsh and
Logan Valley led to a different result, however, in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner 4 -- another case involving a private shopping mall. In Lloyd,
handbillers inside the shopping mall distributed anti-Vietnam War literature-a task unrelated to the economic business of the mall. The
Supreme Court thus faced the issue it expressly did not address in Logan Valley. This time the decision fell on the side of private property
rights. Whereas the picketers in Logan Valley had to be near the store
for their picketing to be effective, these handbillers had reasonable alternatives available in distributing their literature; there was no necessity to carry on their activity in the mall. To impose first amendment
constraints on the mall owners would diminish property rights without
41
significantly enhancing free speech rights.
If the language in Jackson is taken literally, the case seems to be
36. Id. at 506; accord, Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (segregated park).
The Court in Marsh was also mindful of the preferred position occupied by those wishing to exercise first amendment freedoms, as opposed to the less advantageously positioned property rights of the owners of the town. See 326 U.S. at 509; text accompanying notes 52-54 infra.
37. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
38. Id. at 319-20.
39. See id. at 324.
40. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
41. See id. at 564-67.
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a departure from previous holdings in certain important respects. The
essence of the prior "public function" cases such as Marsh, Lloyd, and
Logan Valley is that a private group may attain a close enough relationship to the public that constitutional interests of members of the public
outweigh the private interests of property owners in restricting the use
of their property. 42 Thus a balancing process is at work between competing legitimate interests: a finding of state action may protect constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and religion as in Marsh,
but it also may subject one who is a private property owner to constitu43
tional limitations in the use of his property.
While Jackson is not inconsistent with prior cases in its requirement that a private entity exercise powers "traditionally associated with
sovereignty" 44 to perform a "public function," it does formulate new
doctrine by requiring that those privately exercised powers be imposed
upon the state by statute.45 In neither Marsh nor Logan Valley does
it appear that state statutory obligations were being privately performed
-it was sufficient that a private entity was in control of the sole means
of access to a town's business district, either through ownership of the
streets themselves or their functional equivalents-a control clearly associated with sovereignty. 46 One could easily conclude that a privately
owned utility also provides services "associated with sovereignty,"4
since such services are governmentally provided when they are not pri48
vately supplied under government regulation.
Furthermore, prior to Jackson, no court analyzing an interrelationship between a regulated or licensed private entity and a state regulatory agency had ever implied that, for private action to be attributable
to the state, the state would actually have had to order that action. In
Pollack, it was sufficient that a state agency approved the practice after
42. See Note, 60 VA. L. REV., supra note 20, at 851-54; cf. Williams, supra note
10, at 378.
43. Cf. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
44. See 95 S. L. at 454.
45. Id.

46. But see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), where it was found that
there were no overriding public interests in permitting handbilling in a shopping mall
when reasonable alternatives on public property were available.
47. Accord, Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973).
48. In North Carolina, based on the 1960 census, sixteen communities of ten thousand population and over supplied electric utility services municipally, while five privately owned companies served the rest of the state. 1963 MooDY's PUBLIC UTaLITY
MANUAL a86, a98.
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the fact. Likewise in Burton, the Parking Authority never ordered the
Eagle Restaurant to engage in racial discrimination. The Court in
CBS emphasized that the Federal Communications Commission did not
foster or encourage the challenged conduct, and in Moose Lodge it
spoke in terms of "significant involvement" by the state. Thus, unless
its result is based on unarticulated considerations, Jackson may signify
a substantial retreat from prior state action decisions.
To Justice Marshall, the most troubling aspect of the majority's
opinion was -that, if Metropolitan's termination does not involve state
action for due process purposes, presumably, if the utility decided not
to serve minorities, it also would not involve state action 49 -the underlying constitutional claims would be irrelevant -to-the state action determination. Yet it seems almost inconceivable that the Supreme Court
would countenance racial discrimination on the part of a state-regulated
and protected monopoly, dispensing a necessity of modem life.50
There is a strong probability, then, as Justice Marshall himself seemed
to recognize, that unspoken factors lay at the root of the Court's narrow
interpretation of state action in this case.51 State action may be but
a shorthand phrase, obscuring a far more sophisticated analysis than
merely looking for a sufficient quantum of state involvement in what
appears to be private conduct. 52 The underlying question is not
whether there is "state action," but whether there is "state action" that
violates constitutional rights, for counterbalanced against one person's
claim that he has been discriminated against or denied due process is
another person's asserted right to discriminate, or to use his property
as he sees fit.5" In cases discussed previously, the prevailing interests
were freedom of speech and religion in Marsh, freedom of speech in
Logan Valley, property rights in Lloyd (where free speech interests
49. 95 S. Ct. at 465 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Lower courts, however, have explicitly recognized that different standards of finding "state action" may apply, depending
on the importance of the alleged deprivation. See, e.g., Grafton v. Brooklyn Law
School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973).
50. See Williams, supra note 10, at 365-66.
51. Marshall's dissent on two occasions mentions what some of these unspoken
considerations may be. He cites the value of preserving a private sector of individual
choice, free of constitutional restraints, and the administrative burdens that a due process
requirement could impose on utilities. See 95 S. Ct. at 464. See also Note, 74 CoLUM.
L. REv., supra note 9, at 662; Note, 60 VA. L. Rv., supra note 20.
52. See Note, 60 VA. L. Rav., supra note 20; cf. Black, supra note 2, at 100-03;
Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 487
(1962); Williams, supra note 10, at 389-90. See generally Note, Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery: Is There More to Equal Protection than State Action?, 53 N.C.L. Rav.
-(1975).

53. See Henkin, supra note 52, at 487.
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had other easily attainable outlets), and freedom of the press in CBS.
Property rights of an almost chauvinistically private club prevailed over
an equal protection challenge in Moose Lodge, but not in Burton,
where the property rights of a public restaurant carried far less
weight.
Viewed in this light, Jackson may be less important for its state
action analysis than for its insight into the majority's feelings about the
right to a hearing prior to a discontinuance of utility services for nonpayment.55 It seems unlikely, however, that the Court would have
considered an erroneous termination of electrical service in isolation to
be an insignificant matter. 5 More likely, the Court was also concerned with the administrative difficulties and expense that a large
number of generally unmeritorious disputes could generate for the utilities if a hearing were required in each case.57 Moreover, the utilities
find termination notices to be useful bill collecting devices, 8 the effectiveness of which could be weakened by a hearing requirement.
Whether Jackson reflects a concern that erroneous terminations are too
infrequent 59 to warrant due process protection or that the procedures
required to prevent them would be too unwieldly, the Supreme Court's
analysis in past state action cases implies that at the foundation of Jackson lay an inarticulated premise that the rights of utility customers to
a timely termination hearing are insufficient to override the private
property interests of the public utility owners.
54. See Note, 60 VA. L. REV., supra note 20, at 850.
55. See generally Note, 53 N.C.L. REV., supra note 52.
56. The need for procedural safeguards prior to such a termination is ostensibly
to prevent erroneous terminations. The right of a utility to discontinue service for actual, undisputed nonpayment has not been challenged. Erroneous or not, however, it
cannot be denied that a utility termination is a serious and potentially dangerous matter.
This was underscored by the deaths of a couple in their nineties in upstate New York
on Christmas Eve, 1973. They froze to death after their heat had been cut off for nonpayment of bills. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1973, at 25 col. 1.
57. Justice Marshall answered this concern by reminding the majority that a fullscale, formal hearing need not be required to satisfy due process standards, but that abbreviated procedures could suffice. See 95 S. Ct. at 464-65 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
58. In 1973 Consolidated Edison (serving the State of New York) delivered about
2.8 million disconnect notices while only about 102,000 residences were actually terminated. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1974, at 20 col. 4. The State Public Service Commissioner was also quoted as saying, "The disconnect notice is an effective collection tool
which is necessary for the financial viability of the utilities." Id.
59. One recent survey indicated that out of a seventeen-city area, serving about 19
million utility customers, there were 310,000 terminations for nonpayment in the space
of one year, or roughly 1.5%. There was no indication, however, how many of these
terminations were discovered to be erroneous. See Comment, The Shutoff of Utility
Services for Nonpayment: A Plight of the Poor, 46 WAsH. L. REv. 745, 777 (1971).
But see note 92 infra.
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Of course, such property interests would not be a factor, nor would

there be a preliminary state action inquiry, if the utility under attack
were municipally owned. There would, however, still be one threshold
question to be answered before the elements of due process could be
considered: whether there is a "property" interest in utility service
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
UTILITY SERVICE AS A "PROPERTY"

INTEREST

Paralleling the recent expansion in the areas to which the stateaction concept has been applied 0 has been an expansion in the range
of liberty and property interests held to be protected by the fourteenth

amendment from deprivation without due process of law. 61 Generally,
the cases have required some sort of vested interest or expectancy in
the alleged right.6 The "interest or expectancy" must be more than
a mere subjective expectancy, however.6 3 It must at least be rooted
in an informal, mutual understanding or agreement, 64 or, if not, in a
formal statute or set of rules.6 5 It is clear that the independent source
of an "interest or expectancy" need not be the Constitution itself.

6

Under these judicially defined tests, there are two avenues by
which utility services may qualify as protected property interests. The
more tenuous of these would be based upon an informal expectancy,

rooted in the essential nature of these services, and the fact that virtually everyone not only receives them, but takes them for granted as
60. See cases cited note 19 supra.
61. See Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975) (public school education); Fusari v.
Steinberg, 95 S. Ct. 533 (1975) (unemployment compensation benefits); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) ("good time" sentence reductions); Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (food stamps); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593 (1972) (employment in state university system); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972) (parole revocation); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver's license);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits); Thompson v. Washington,
497 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Burr v. New Rochelle Mun. Housing Authority, 479
F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1973) (rent increases). But see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1974) (federal civil service employment); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972) (employment in state university system).
62. Compare Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), with Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
63. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972).
64. Id. at 601.
65. See Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 735 (1975); Thompson v. Washington, 497
F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
66. Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 735 (1975); cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539 (1974); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972).
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a modem necessity.67 It may not be necessary, however, to rely on
an informal expectancy if there is a statutory requirement that all utilities in a state provide reasonably continous service.6 In this situation,
utility customers apparently would have a property right under state law
without satisfaction of some minimal elethat could not be divested
69
ments of due process.
While the nature of a property interest is relevant to determining
whether due process applies, the importance of the alleged deprivation
is crucial to the form that due process will take in a particular case.70
The interest of a person in avoiding a property deprivation must be
balanced against the government's interest in summary disposition of
disputed claims.71 Thus, while as a general proposition some form of
prior notice and hearing will be required as long as a deprived property
right is not de minimis, when prompt action is necessary to protect an
important public interest, even substantive rights in private property
can be abrogated summarily. 72 Similarly, it would appear that entitlements to property not substantively protected by the due process
clause, but still subject to procedural protection, 73 can be deprived
without prior procedural safeguards if the public interest predomi74
nates.
It should be emphasized, however, that even when this balancing
process weighs in favor of prior procedural safeguards, it does not nec67. "Although such items as a stove, a stereophonic phonograph, a table and a bed
are 'deserving of due process protection,' 'the requirements of due process should be more
embracing' when an absolute necessity of modem life such as electricity is involved."
Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638, 669 (7th Cir. 1972) (en banc)
(Sprecher, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
68. See note 8 supra.
69. In Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 735-36 (1975), a state statute providing for
mandatory public school education formed the basis of the Supreme Court's decision,
holding that students could not be suspended from school for a period of ten days or
less without prior procedural safeguards.
70. "[A] weighing process has long been a part of any determination of the form
of hearing required in particular situations by procedural due process." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972).
71. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970).
72. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-92 (1972). Cases where circumstances
have justified summary procedures include: Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339
U.S. 594 (1950) (protect public from misbranded drugs); United States v. Pfitsch, 256
U.S. 547 (1921) (meet needs of war effort); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of
Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (contaminated foods).
73. E.g., Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 735 (1975) (public education); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits).
74. Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 740-41 (1975); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134 (1974).
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essarily follow that a full evidentiary hearing will be required. *Due

process may be satisfied with very abbreviated procedural safeguards. 75 Factors that have influenced the extensiveness of required
prior procedures are the seriousness of the deprivation,7 6 the length of
the deprivation, 77 the nature and extent of available subsequent proceedings, 78 and the existence of special interests of the state in abbre-

viated procedures. 79

Irrespective of these factors, however, it is ele-

mentary to any form of due process that there be a timely and adequate

notice of the proposed deprivation and an opportunity to be heard "at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."8
In Goldberg v. Kelly8 the Court faced a procedure to terminate

public assistance payments that consisted solely of a post-termination
hearing.

No personal appearance by the person to be terminated, no

oral presentation of evidence, and no confrontation of adverse witnesses was required prior to the discontinuance of payments. Crucial
to the Court's decision, finding this procedure inadequate, was a recog-

nition that a welfare termination pending a later resolution may deprive
an eligible welfare recipient of "the very means by which to live while

he waits.

82

The Court noted, however, that a formal trial need not

be provided at the pretermination stage; the hearing would have only

to provide an initial determination of welfare eligibility to protect
against erroneous termination.8 3 The fatal flaw in the post-termination
procedure was that it failed to provide an opportunity for the welfare

recipient to present oral evidence before an impartial decision-maker,
or to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses prior to the termi75. See Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
76. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (loss of driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (loss of welfare benefits); Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (garnishment of wages). Compare Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539 (1974), with Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
77. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
416 U.S. 600 (1974).
78. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). Compare North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975), with Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
416 U.S. 600 (1974).
79. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561-63 (1974).
80. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972). See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
"If the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its full purpose, then, it is clear that
it must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented." Fuentes v.
Shevin, supra at 81.
81. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
82. Id. at 264.
83. Id. at 266-67.
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nation. 4 While no particular order of proof or mode of presenting evidence was required by the Court, the neutral arbiter's decision had to
rest solely on the legal rules and evidence presented at the hearing,
and he was required to state the reasons for his decision, and the evidence relied on.8
At the opposite end of the informal due process spectrum is Goss
v. Lopez, 8 a case involving a ten-day suspension of students from a
public school. Only a post-suspension hearing was provided for by
school procedures. The Supreme Court stated that "the timing and
content of the notice and the nature of the hearing will depend on appropriate accommodation of the competing interests involved. 8s7 In
this case, a mistaken exclusion from the educational process had to be
balanced against the need for discipline in the public schools. Limiting
its opinion to cases involving suspensions of ten days or less, the Court
required that prior to suspension a student be given an oral or written
notice of charges, an explanation of the evidence against him, and a
chance to tell his side of the story. 8 However, this abbreviated "hearing" would follow immediately after the notice, and would, in effect,
be little more than an informal discussion in the principal's office. None
of the formalities of Goldberg were required, in recognition of the
large number of short suspensions and of the administrative burdens
that more formal requirements would impose upon public schools.89
Electrical service is a vital need in today's society to the comfort,
if not livability, of the modem home. Its loss surely can be considered
as serious a deprivation as the loss of one's driver's license,90 or a few
days of public school education, or perhaps even a temporary deprivation of welfare benefits. 9 At a very minimum, therefore, an individual should be afforded an adequate notice prior to termination and an
opportunity personally to dispute any amounts claimed to be due. Using prior informal due process cases as a guide, standards can be postulated for adequate and meaningful notice and hearing.
84. Id. at 268-271.
85. Id. at 271.
86. 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
87. Id. at 738-39.
88. Id. at 740.
89. Cases involving suspensions of longer than ten days would presumably require
more formal proceedings, since the deprivation to the student would be more serious,
Id. at 741.
90. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
91. See Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 447 (S,D.N.Y.
1972).
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"Adequate" notice must be received sufficiently in advance of a
termination to enable a consumer to forestall such termination by either
paying his bill or notifying the company if it is in error.92 In Goldberg,
the Supreme Court did not find New York's seven-day notice to be in-

sufficient per se, but it intimated that fairness may sometimes dictate
a longer period. 93 Notice must also be more than a bare statement

threatening a termination in a matter of days or weeks if payment is
not made. In addition to reasons for the proposed termination, there
should be a notification that if there is a dispute, recourse may be had
to either company officials or the Public Utility Commission.94
Where the resolution of a disputed claim depends upon findings

of fact, especially with respect to credibility, an opportunity to present
oral evidence is a necessary component of due process.9 5 At a mini-

mum, a pre-termination hearing96 should be designed to establish the
"probable validity" 97 of a utility's entitlement to a disputed amount.
Although such a hearing may be informal, cases establish that an impartial decision-maker,9 8 such as a member of the State Public Utility
Commission, should be provided, and that the reasons for his determi-

nation, as well as the evidence relied upon, should be specified. 99
Goldberg strongly supported a right to confrontation and cross92. Utility Company error in terminating service is not insignificant. As many
as 16% of the complaints investigated by the New York Public Service Commission result in adjustments in favor of the consumer. Id. at 448 n.ll.
93. 397 U.S. at 268.
94. See Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153, 166 (6th Cir. 1973); Bronson
v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
95. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970); cf. Burr v. New Rochelle
Mun. Housing Authority, 479 F.2d 1165, 1169 (2d Cir. 1973).
96. In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), due process was found
not to require a hearing before issuance of a writ of seizure for certain household goods.
That case is distinguishable from Jackson, however, in that the same statute that authorized the issuance of the writ also mandated a timely hearing subsequent to the seizure.
Thus the length of time of a potentially erroneous property deprivation was greatly limited. See text accompanying notes 76-79 supra. In contrast, the applicable statute in
Jackson gives the Public Utilities Commission complete discretion in refusing to grant
a hearing if, in the Commission's opinion, it would not be in the public interest. See
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1393 (1959). Jackson is further distinguishable in that it involved an extremely serious property deprivation, while Mitchell involved the deprivation
of such arguably non-essential items as a stereo and a refrigerator. Compare Mitchell
v. W.T. Grant Co., supra, with North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct.
719 (1975).
97. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 609 (1974); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971); Sniadach
v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
98. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970); cf. Fusari v. Steinberg, 95
S. Ct. 533, 538 (1975).
99. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
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examination in the welfare context, but a more recent case casts some
doubt on the indispensability of that requirement. In Fusari v. Steinberg'00 the Court remanded a case partly for consideration of whether
a requirement that examiners base their decisions on eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits only on evidence submitted in person or in writing might ameliorate the absence of a confrontation requirement.' 0 ' Perhaps an accommodation can be reached whereby a
confrontation requirement would be imposed in cases where, for example, credibility is an important issue to be determined.
CONCLUSION

Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison casts serious doubt on whether
constitutional proscriptions are likely to be imposed on privately owned
utility companies in the near future. Apparently the Court felt that
the need to preserve private decision-making in the use of one's property was a worthier consideration in the private utility context than providing a customer with a hearing prior to a service termination. The
Supreme Court has yet to rule on a similar case involving a governmentally owned utility, but prior, analogous cases strongly suggest that
the almost universal necessity of electricity and the hardships that its
deprivation would cause would carry the day for some informal prior
procedures to prevent the erroneous termination that one court has
termed an "Orwellian nightmare of computer control."'10 2
RAYMOND

M.

BERNSTEIN

100. 95 S. Ct. 533 (1975).
101. Id. at 538.
102. See Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 444 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).

